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The overall security posture of information systems (IS) depends on the behaviors of the 
IS users. Several studies have shown that users are the greatest vulnerability to IS 
security. The proliferation of smartphones is introducing an entirely new set of risks, 
threats, and vulnerabilities. Smartphone devices amplify this data exposure problem by 
enabling instantaneous transmission and storage of personally identifiable information 
(PII) by smartphone users, which is becoming a major security risk. Moreover, 
companies are also capitalizing on the availability and powerful computing capabilities of 
these smartphone devices and developing a bring-your-own-device (BYOD) program, 
which makes companies susceptible to divulgence of organizational proprietary 
information and sensitive customer information. In addition to users being the greatest 
risk to IS security, several studies have shown that many people do not implement even 
the most basic security countermeasures on their smartphones. The lack of security 
countermeasures implementation, risky user behavior, and the amount of sensitive 
information stored and transmitted on smartphones is becoming an ever-increasing 
problem. 
 
A literature review revealed a significant gap in literature pertaining to smartphone 
security. This study identified six socio-cognitive factors from the domain of traditional 
computer security which have shown to have an impact on user security behaviors and 
practices. The six factors this study identified and analyzed are mobile information 
security self-efficacy, institutional trust, party trust, and awareness of smartphone risks, 
threats, and vulnerabilities and their influence on smartphone security practices and 
behaviors. The analysis done in this research was confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) – 
structural equation modeling (SEM). The goal of this study was to cross-validate 
previously validated factors within the context of traditional computer security and assess 
their applicability in the context of smartphone security. Additionally, this study assessed 
the influential significance of these factors on the security behaviors and practices of 
smartphone users.  
 
 
 
This study used a Web-based survey and was distributed to approximately 539 users 
through Facebook® and LinkedIn® social media outlets which resulted in 275 responses 
for a 51% response rate. After pre-analysis data screening was completed, there were a 
total of 19 responses that had to be eliminated due to unengaged responses and outliers 
leaving 256 responses left to analyze. The results of the analysis found that vulnerability 
awareness, threat awareness, and risk awareness are interrelated to one another which all 
in turn had significance in predicting self-efficacy, security practices, and behaviors. This 
intricate relationship revealed in this study indicates that a user has to have an increased 
awareness in all three categories of awareness before they can fully understand how to 
protect themselves. Having an increased awareness in one category does not impact the 
overall security posture of the user and that risk, threat, and vulnerability awareness all 
work together. Another interesting find was that as risk awareness increased the less the 
smartphone users protected themselves. This finding warrants additional research to 
investigate why the user is more averse to risk, and willing to accept the risk, despite their 
increased awareness. Finally, institutional trust and party trust was found not to have any 
significance on any of the factors.  
 
These findings should give smartphone users and organizations insight into specific areas 
to focus on in minimizing inappropriate security behaviors and practices of smartphone 
users. More specifically, users and organizations need to focus on educating users on all 
three factors of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities in order for there to have any impact on 
increasing self-efficacy and reducing inappropriate security behaviors and practices.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
Security risks are inherently present in all information systems (IS). Every 
Internet user is susceptible to IS risks. Moreover, users have a tendency to exhibit poor 
Internet security practices which puts their IS at risk of compromise (Anderson, Durbin, 
& Salinger, 2008; Ramim & Levy, 2006; Stanton, Stram, Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). 
One of the most significant risky behaviors by Internet users is not implementing 
appropriate security measures to protect themselves from cyber attacks which could 
result in divulging of personally identifiable information (PII) or other potentially 
embarrassing personal information. Many users lack the awareness and understanding 
that sensitive information exposure has a devastating impact (Blackmon, Kitajima, & 
Polson, 2003). Since many users store PII and other sensitive information on their 
computing devices, their devices are prime targets for cyber attacks, and users can 
unknowingly divulge PII due to lack of protection.  
The proliferation of smartphone devices amplifies the data exposure problem by 
enabling instantaneous transmission and storage of PII by smartphone users, which is 
becoming a major security risk. As Van Bruggen et al. (2013) stated, “Unfortunately, the 
expanding availability and usage of mobile devices brings an increased security risk” (p. 
1). However, smartphone security risks are not limited to exposure of PII.  
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Many organizations are trying to capitalize on the popularity of smartphone 
devices by adopting a bring-your-own-device (BYOD) concept. This BYOD concept is 
perpetuating the problem of sensitive data exposure by allowing employees to use their 
personally owned, often unprotected, smartphones to perform work-related transactions. 
As the lines between personal and business use continue to become increasingly blurred, 
the transmission and storage of organizational proprietary information is also at risk 
(Landman, 2012). Several studies have indicated that smartphone devices are leading to 
significant organizational and personal IS risks, which can result in divulgence of both 
PII and organizational proprietary information (hereinafter, collectively referred to as 
sensitive information) (Distefano, Grillo, Lentini, & Italiano, 2010; Zhou, Zhang, Jiang, 
& Freeh, 2011).  
Problem Statement 
The research problem that this study addressed is inappropriate security behaviors 
and practices by smartphone users are leading to the exposure and compromise of 
sensitive information (Dorflinger, Voth, Kramer, & Fromm, 2010; Shaw, Chen, Harris, & 
Huang, 2009). The proliferation of smartphone devices is introducing new IS risks, which 
if not properly mitigated through appropriate security practices and behaviors, can result 
in the exposure of sensitive data (Anderson et al., 2008; Chin, Felt, Sekar, & Wagner, 
2012; Furnell, Tsaganidi, & Phippen, 2008; Jones & Heinrichs, 2012; Landman, 2010; 
Van Bruggen et al., 2013).  
Although many users are fully aware of the threats to IS security, such as viruses 
and malware, smartphones introduce unique risks and vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by threats specific to smartphones (Husted, Saïdi, & Gehani, 2011; Jeon, Kim, 
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Lee, & Won, 2011). Moreover, traditional computer security mechanisms are generally 
not available, nor applicable, to smartphones (Landman, 2010). These unique risks, 
threats, and vulnerabilities make smartphones ideal targets for exploitation which can 
result in release of sensitive information (Botha, Furnell, & Clarke, 2009; Jeon et al., 
2011).  
Prior research on IS security behaviors has mainly focused on the analysis of the 
specific behavior (Stanton et al., 2005). However, very few studies have been conducted 
that focused on the socio-cognitive behaviors that affect IS user security practices and 
security behaviors (Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2010). Moreover, although an abundance of 
IS security focused literature exists; the literature is mainly rooted in the domain of 
traditional computing devices (see Albrechtsen, 2007; Botha et al., 2009; Furnell, 2008; 
Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2010; Kruger & Kearney, 2006; Rhee et al., 2009; Stanton et 
al., 2005).  
Several traditional computing studies have shown that there are specific factors 
that have influenced the lack of security tool adoption and overall security behaviors of 
computer users. For example, Crossler and Belanger (2006) determined that self-efficacy 
was highly correlated to the adoption rate of security applications. Rhee, Kim, and Ryu 
(2009), later reaffirmed that self-efficacy had a significant influence on not only security 
practices, but also on overall security behaviors. Additionally, Huang et al. (2010) 
determined that awareness of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities are significant in 
determining the level of self-reported self-efficacy. Chin et al. (2012) and Furnell et al. 
(2008) discovered that trust in security applications was a significant factor in the 
adoption rate of the security applications. Finally, Allam, Flowerday, and Flowerday 
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(2014) noted a dichotomous view between computer users and organizations on exactly 
whose responsibility it was to secure the computing devices. Furnell et al. (2008) 
discovered that computer users believe it is the responsibility of the software 
manufactures to secure the computer devices. In other words, the users surveyed in the 
Furnell et al. (2008) study believed the operating system and software programs should 
be developed vulnerability free. Therefore, the user feels they should not have to take any 
precautions in protecting their data. 
A literature review has revealed a gap in the literature between traditional 
computer and smartphone security. Most of the available literature about smartphone 
security primarily focused on specific malware and hardware attacks and how these 
attacks exploit specific smartphone security architectures (Mylonas et al., 2013). Very 
little research was found that focuses on smartphone user security behaviors and 
practices, which is considered relatively new in the field of research (Mylonas et al., 
2013; Park & Chen, 2007). Therefore, this study began to address this gap and examined 
the factors that have shown to have an influence on security behaviors and practices in 
the traditional computing domain, and tested their applicability and validity in the domain 
of smartphones through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)-structural equation modeling 
(SEM). 
Dissertation Goal 
The main goal of this study was to explore the validity and reliability for 
measures of the following constructs: mobile information security (InfoSec) self-efficacy 
(MISE), vulnerability awareness (VA), threat awareness (TA), risk awareness (RA), party 
trust (PT), institutional trust (IT), security practices (SP), and security behaviors (SB).  
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Users ultimately determine the overall security posture of an IS (Jones & 
Heinrichs, 2012; Rhee et al., 2009; Tsohou, Kokolakis, Karyda, & Kiountouzis, 2014). 
Furthermore, Furnell et al. (2008) stated, “users have significant issues with their online 
behaviors, carrying out risky online practices” (p. 235). Therefore, this study investigated 
socio-cognitive factors that influence smartphone users’ security practices. Figure 1 
depicts the proposed conceptual framework for this study. The intended result of this 
study was to empirically assess the validity and reliability of previously validated factors 
embedded within the traditional computing domain. These factors may be used by 
researchers and practitioners to determine specific areas that require increased attention 
in order to improve the positive security practices and behaviors of smartphone users. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model for Factors Affecting Smartphone User Security 
Research Question 
This study examined socio-cognitive factors that are believed to affect the overall 
security practices and behaviors by smartphone users. This study is grounded in social-
cognitive theory (SCT) (Bandura, 1977; Compeau & Higgins, 1995) and IS literature 
(Ben-Asher et al., 2011; Botha et al., 2009; Chin et al., 2012; Crossler & Bélanger, 2006; 
Furnell, 2008; Huang et al., 2010; Rhee et al., 2009; Shaw et al., 2009). The main 
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research question this study addressed was: Do the factors of Mobile InfoSec self-
efficacy, vulnerability awareness, threat awareness, risk awareness, institutional trust, and 
party trust demonstrate high reliability and validity in determining smartphone users’ 
security practices and security behaviors? The purpose of this study was to conduct 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the validity, reliability, and model fit of these 
factors as well as conduct structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis to analyze the 
relationships between the factors within the domain of smartphone security. 
Relevance and Significance 
Computer security has been around for decades and has been studied since as 
early as the 1970s (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975). However, as new innovative computing 
products come to market, research on these devices typically lags behind (Park & Chen, 
2007). A literature review on smartphone security revealed very little literature available 
on the subject, especially concerning user behaviors as it pertains to smartphone user 
security behaviors and practices. This can be attributed to the fact that smartphone 
security is still considered a relatively new subject in the field of IS security (Mylonas et 
al., 2013). The few studies that were discovered during literature review usually focused 
on a single, isolated factor such as perceived risk or were focused on hardware/software 
exploits. Multiple factors need to be considered when investigating the causes of user 
behaviors (Huang et al., 2010). Therefore, this study attempted to bridge this apparent 
gap in smartphone security literature. 
The need for this work is demonstrated by Furnell (2008), Furnell et al. (2008), 
Huang et al. (2010), Jones and Heinrichs (2012), Landman (2010), and Rhee et al. 
(2009). Jones and Heinrichs argued that the proliferation of smartphones is increasing the 
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overall risk of data breaches. Landman noted that as organizations continue to increase 
their reliance on smartphones, the storage and transmission rate of sensitive data will also 
continue to increase. Furnell et al. argued that rapid technological advancements of 
devices are far outpacing the available security, thereby increasing the risks of sensitive 
data exposure. Furthermore, Furnell stated “although a new generation of ‘digital natives’ 
is emerging that are more IT-literate, this by no means implies that they will be more 
naturally security-aware” (p. 9). Rhee et al. argued that there are social-cognitive factors, 
such as self-efficacy, security consciousness, and a person’s cognitive ability to control 
threats and risks all play a significant role in the adoption of security applications and 
behaviors and requires further investigation. Finally, Huang et al. noted that studying risk 
by itself is not sufficient in trying to determine the security practices of users and that 
other factors need to be investigated. 
This study sought to gain a deeper understanding into the factors that influence 
smartphone user security practices and security behaviors. As previously described, the 
bulk of IS security research has been mainly conducted in the traditional computing 
domain. Unfortunately, information security and protection of sensitive data continues to 
be a problem (Shaw et al., 2009), and several studies noted that users are typically the 
problem in IS security (Chin et al., 2012; Furnell, 2008; Furnell et al., 2007, 2008; 
Kruger & Kearney, 2006; Ramim & Levy, 2006; Rhee et al., 2009; Van Bruggen et al., 
2013). As information security and protection of data continue to be a problem, coupled 
with the fact that users continue to be the main problem, smartphones are only 
compounding this problem. 
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This study is significant because it will advance smartphone security research and 
facilitate an increase in the body of knowledge regarding the factors that influence 
smartphone user security behaviors and practices. Understanding user behaviors is 
critical in IS security (Hazari, Hargrave, & Clenney, 2008). As previously noted, current 
research has typically only studied perceived risks and has failed to explore other factors 
that influence IS security behaviors, such as perceived threats and perceived 
vulnerabilities and has typically focused on traditional computing (Huang et al., 2010). 
Thus, to address this gap, this study explored additional factors that influence smartphone 
user behaviors and practices. 
This study also has practical implications for organizations that allow BYOD. The 
study statistically assessed factors identified in traditional IS security literature review 
and tested them for reliability and validity in the context of smartphones. Now 
completed, organizations may use the results to assess their smartphone information 
security plans and identify areas of improvement or non-applicability. 
Barriers and Issues 
The goal of this research was to determine the impacts of Vulnerability 
Awareness (VA), Risk Awareness (RA), Threat Awareness (TA), Mobile InfoSec Self-
Efficacy (MISE), Institutional Trust (IT), and Party Trust (PT) on smartphone user’s 
Security Practices (SP) and Security Behaviors (SB). One potential barrier that existed 
was the number of survey responses required to ensure a sufficient statistical sample to 
conduct CFA-SEM. A literature review has revealed that there is not a hard and steadfast 
rule concerning the minimum number of responses in order to conduct CFA-SEM. 
However, nearly all literature has agreed that N>200 is a sufficient number of minimum 
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responses to conduct the statistical analysis. The results of the data collection effort 
netted 275 total responses. 
Another potential issue was that users may not be completely honest in their 
answers due to fear of lack of anonymity. To mitigate this, a disclaimer was posted at the 
top of the survey to inform the respondents that all users would remain anonymous, their 
participation was voluntary, and they could have exited the survey at any time. 
Furthermore, the survey was devoid of any questions that may result in traceability back 
to the respondent. 
Finally, another possible barrier was the length of the survey. Long surveys have 
shown to lead to non-response issue and early exit from the survey by the respondent 
(Bogen, 1996; Galesic & Bosnjak, 2009; Herzog & Bachman, 1981). Although most of 
the constructs were previously validated in prior literature, an expert panel was created to 
ensure the questions were properly worded, not redundant, and applicable to the study to 
help mitigate this issue. The results of the data collection showed potential survey length 
issues since 13 response sets had to be eliminated from the analysis portion in order to 
avoid skewing the results. The estimated length of the survey was 10 minutes. 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
1) It was assumed that participants were honest in their responses; 
2) It was assumed that the participants either presently used or have previously 
used a smartphone device; 
3) It was assumed that the participants made a valiant effort to complete the 
survey in its entirety with accurate reflections of their behaviors and/or beliefs.  
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Limitations 
One limitation of this study was that the survey was disseminated through the 
author’s social media outlets (e.g., Facebook® & LinkedIn®). This participant 
recruitment medium was selected due to the demographic diversity and the amount of 
potential respondents. Studies have shown that social media sites are an excellent tool for 
recruiting survey participants (Ramo & Prochaska, 2012; Ta, Forgasz, Leder, & McLeod, 
2012). In an unpublished article by Simpson, Nilsen, Levy, and Cohen (2013), 
Facebook® was used to recruit participants to engage in a similar study which resulted in 
240 responses in a little less than 30 days. Thus, using LinkedIn® in addition to 
Facebook® expanded the prospective participant pool. Between the two social media 
outlets, there were a total of 539 total available participants. Of these 539, 275 people 
responded for a response rate of 50.6%. However, it should be noted that some bias may 
have been introduced through using these social media tools based on the possible 
assumption of users being technologically savvy merely because they can utilize social 
media tools.  
Additionally, this study was adapted from the domain of traditional computing to 
test for validity and reliability in the context of smartphones. Therefore, the constructs 
that were selected for this study had yet to be validated and/or used in the context of 
smartphones. The purpose of this study was to determine the constructs’ applicability to 
the smartphone context. Therefore, a potential finding may have been that some of the 
constructs are not valid in the new context.  
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Delimitations 
One of the delimitations of this study was that users may not have been aware of 
the differences between risks, vulnerabilities, and threats. To address the potential 
confusion between risks, vulnerabilities, and threats, precise definitions of each were 
provided from published literature at the beginning of that respective section of the 
survey.  
Definition of Terms 
Definitions of key terms used in this document are outlined below: 
Computer security is the protection of computing systems against threats to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer systems (Summers, 1997).  
Information security is “the protection of personal data against accidental or 
intentional disclosure to unauthorized persons, or unauthorized modifications or 
destruction” (Udo, 2001, p. 165). 
Information security awareness is “the degree of understanding of users about 
the importance of information security and their responsibilities and acts to exercise 
sufficient levels of information security control to protect the organization’s data and 
networks” (Shaw et al., 2009, p. 92). 
Institutional trust is the faith a user has that online application stores only 
distribute software that is safe for use, free from defects, and devoid of malicious code 
(Mui et al., 2002). 
Mobile InfoSec Self-efficacy (MISE) is a person’s belief in their own abilities to 
exercise control over events and actions related to their mobile devices. 
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Party trust is the faith a user has that a software developer has made the software 
safe for use, free from defects, and devoid of malicious code (Mui et al., 2002). 
Personally identifiable information (PII) is “Information which can be used to 
distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their name, social security number, 
date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, biometric records, including any other 
personal information which is linked or linkable to a specified individual” (DoN, 2012). 
Proprietary data are “Documents and data that has [sic] been generated by the 
company to allow it to control and safeguard its competitiveness over other companies” 
(Proprietary Data, n.d.). 
Risk awareness is the amount of awareness a person has pertaining to information 
security risks (Stanton et al., 2005). 
Risky behaviors are defined as inappropriate and destructive behaviors that 
reduce the overall effectiveness of IS security posture (Stanton et al., 2005). 
Security behaviors are the security conscious behaviors and actions that users 
demonstrate/conduct while using their mobile device (Rhee et al., 2009). 
Security practices is the technological aspect that users take (i.e., installing 
security applications) to protect their mobile device (Rhee et al., 2009).  
Self-efficacy is a person’s belief in his/her own abilities to exercise control over 
given events (Ozer & Bandera, 1990). 
Sensitive information is both PII and organizational proprietary data. 
Smartphone is a high-powered, small-form-factor computing device that blends a 
rich, hardware-computing platform with that of a traditional specialized cellular phone 
(Husted et al., 2011). 
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Threat awareness is the amount of awareness a person has as it pertains to 
information security threats. 
Trust is “the subjective probability which consumers believe that a particular 
transaction will occur in a manner consistent with their confident expectations” 
(Chellappa & Pavlou, 2002, p. 360). 
Vulnerability awareness is the amount of awareness a person has as it relates to 
vulnerabilities of his/her mobile devices. 
Summary 
Information security is an ongoing issue pertaining to safe guarding sensitive 
information. Several studies have been conducted concerning InfoSec within the domain 
of traditional computing. However, very little of the research has focused on the socio-
cognitive factors associated with the adoption of security by computer users. Moreover, 
very little research has been done concerning smartphone InfoSec as it relates to 
smartphone users’ security practices and behaviors. Therefore, a model was developed 
consisting of previously validated constructs from traditional computing to test for 
applicability and validity in the context of smartphone user security practices and 
behaviors. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction 
The literature review is conducted to provide the theoretical foundation for this 
study. The literature review revealed there is little relevant literature available on these 
constructs in the context of smartphones, specifically smartphone user security behaviors 
and practices. This can be mostly attributed to the fact that this is a relatively new field of 
study (Mylonas et al., 2013; Park & Chen, 2007). Reviewing and identifying relevant 
constructs is an imperative part of the literature review (Hart, 1998). The constructs that 
will be investigated in this study are outlined in the proceding sections. 
Background 
Computer and information security research has been studied since as early as the 
1970s (Saltzer & Schroeder, 1975). However, the invention of the smartphone in the mid-
2000s has created new avenues that extend threats to information security by introducing 
an entirely new set of risks and vulnerabilities. Moreover, these threats continue to 
increase because of the exponential growth in smartphone usage (Burns & Johnson, 
2015; Landman, 2010). Unfortunately, computer and information security has failed to 
keep pace with the mobile device community, specifically smartphones (Bickford, 
O'Hare, Baliga, Ganapathy, & Iftode, 2010).  
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The smartphone is a high-powered, small-form-factor computing device that 
blends a rich, hardware-computing platform with that of a traditional specialized cellular 
phone (Husted et al., 2011). Smartphones are not only used for making phone calls, but 
also taking pictures, updating social media statuses, text messaging, storing contact 
information, sending/receiving email, banking, and browsing the Internet. These types of 
usage can not only lead to inadvertent disclosure of sensitive data, but can also exploit 
embarrassed users via criminal blackmail attempts (Muslukhov, Boshmaf, Kuo, Lester, & 
Beznosov, 2013).  
Additionally, smartphones are relatively inexpensive and rich in application 
availability from their respective vendor’s market place (i.e., Apple, Android, and 
Windows) making these smartphones highly desirable (Chin et al., 2012). Smartphone 
popularity has spurred tremendous growth in the development and availability of 
smartphone applications. Unfortunately, some of these applications are used to access 
and exploit personal information (Park, Lee, Kim, Cho, & Choi, 2012).  
Smartphones are becoming so popular due to their computing power, portability, 
and relatively cheap prices that they are supplanting traditional computing devices (Chin 
et al., 2012; Brenner, 2013). According to comScore (2013), as of November 2013, 152.5 
million people in the United States own a smartphone. This equates to 63.8 percent of the 
U.S. population. This increase has created a demand by smartphone users to be able to 
use their smartphones in the workplace. Many companies have responded to this demand 
and, as of 2013, it is estimated that 90% of workforce employees use their personal 
smartphone to conduct work-related transactions (Cisco, 2012).  
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Due to the computing power of these smartphone devices, many organizations are 
becoming more reliant on them as well. As such, many organizations have adopted a 
bring-your-own-device (BYOD) concept. This BYOD concept leads to new IS risks as 
the lines of mobile device usage between personal and business use become increasingly 
blurred (Landman, 2012). Studies have shown that these mobile computing devices are 
leading to significant IS risks to organizations, resulting in identity theft and divulgence 
of proprietary information (Distefano, Grillo, Lentini, & Italiano, 2010; Zhou, Zhang, 
Jiang, & Freeh, 2011). Van Bruggen et al. (2013) also indicated that:  
Unfortunately, the expanding availability and usage of mobile devices brings 
increased security risks. From an organizational perspective, the increased risk is 
two-fold. First, with many users personally owning a variety of capable mobile 
devices, considerable pressure emerges from employees to have their 
organizations embrace Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies. Second, the 
perceived potential for productivity gains offered by capable mobile devices is 
appealing to the organization but tempered by the risks of exposing sensitive data. 
(p. 1) 
Since smartphones are small hand-held computing devices carried virtually 
everywhere, they are frequently lost or stolen (Ballagas, Borchers, Rohs, & Sheridan, 
2006). For example, it is quite easy for a smartphone user to lay the smartphone down 
and walk away, leaving the phone behind. A recent survey by Consumer Reports 
revealed that over 1.4 million smartphones were lost and another 3.1 million stolen in 
2013 (Consumer Reports, 2014). That is double the number of phones stolen in 2012. In 
addition, many of these smartphone devices are often left unsecured, in terms of 
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authentication mechanisms, and lack appropriate security protection such as anti-virus, 
anti-malware, and firewall protection (Ben-Asher et al., 2011; Botha, Furnell, & Clarke, 
2009; Van Bruggen et al., 2013). The increased popularity and adoption of smartphones 
and lack of security countermeasures is creating a significant increase in smartphone IS 
risks. The following study by Symantec Corporation highlights the severity of the threats 
to information security and poor user practices. 
In 2012, Symantec Corporation purposely “lost” 50 smartphones installed with 
remote activity monitoring software (Haley, 2012). The study found that of the 50 
smartphones found by strangers, 96% of the smartphones were accessed and revealed 
personal and proprietary information intrusion such as pictures, text messages, social 
networks, and banking information. In other words, upon finding the smartphones, those 
strangers accessed them with the intent of finding sensitive information stored on the 
phone.  
With the massive amount of smartphones lost each year, specific and special care 
is needed in securing these devices to avoid exposure, loss, and theft of sensitive data. As 
Van Bruggen et al. (2013) stated, “The question becomes when, not if, the mobile device 
will be lost…” (p. 2). This explosion of smartphone popularity is not only leading to 
significant information security risks, but several studies have shown that many of these 
risks are due to inappropriate and risky user behaviors. 
Several studies have argued that users are typically the weakest link in IS security 
and continually put themselves at risk by exhibiting precarious Internet behaviors 
(Anderson, Durbin, & Salinger, 2008; Ramim & Levy, 2006; Stanton, Stram, 
Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005). Furnell et al. (2008) stated, “Users have significant issues 
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with their online behavior, carrying out risky online practices” (p. 235). It has also been 
noted that Internet users divulging PII or other sensitive data is due to their risky security 
practices (Anderson et al., 2008; Chin et al., 2012). Studies have also specifically noted 
that users not utilizing security tools, nor exhibiting security conscious behaviors, are of 
particular importance and are extremely risky (Furnell et al., 2007; Husted et al., 2011; 
Mylonas et al., 2013). Chipperfield and Furnell (2010) also noted that users are 
sometimes unwilling to protect themselves, for one reason or another, which ultimately 
makes smartphone users a prime target for attack. This could be attributable to users 
fearing they will make a mistake in using the tools, will cause damage to the equipment, 
or will prove incompetent on using security applications (Shneiderman, 1992). Users are 
often times not even aware of the susceptibility of attacks on their mobile devices 
(Furnell, Tsaganidi, & Phippen, 2008).This deficiency of security conscious behavior and 
absence of security application and tool usage lowers the security hurdles would-be 
attackers must overcome to gain access to stored data (Anderson et al., 2008; Furnell et 
al., 2008).  
Sensitive data is easily obtainable, whether it be for legitimate or illegitimate 
reasons (Burns and Johnson, 2015; Nurse, Erola, Goldsmith & Creese, 2015). Okenyi and 
Owens (2007), as well as Luo et al. (2007), have also noted that sensitive data is not only 
easily obtainable, but its loss can largely be due to psychological influences by the users. 
Okenyi and Owens, as well as Luo et al., concluded that policies, procedures, and user 
education are pivotal in deterring the dissemination of sensitive data caused by 
psychological factors. Additionally, Workman (2007) stated that the decisions made to 
provide sensitive data are based on fear, authority, trust, and likeability.   
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Although there has been increased publicity concerning IS risks, associated 
threats, and the resultant security breaches, it has done very little to improve the security 
practices and behaviors of Internet users. The occurrence of identity theft and sensitive 
information exposure continues to increase at an alarming rate due to users divulging 
sensitive information (Anderson et al., 2008; Luo, Brody, Seazzu, & Byrd, 2011; 
Workman, 2007). When users divulge this sensitive information, even under the guise of 
increased security, or as a requirement for access such as through a Web interface, it can 
lead to the compromise of sensitive information (Okenyi & Owens, 2007). Moreover, 
smartphone devices are exacerbating these risks, due to their small-form-factor and 
ubiquitous nature. Since users carry their smartphone devices with them all the time, it is 
easy to access unsecured Websites and Wi-Fi and forget about security measures. 
Therefore, due to the increased risks associated with smartphones, and the lack of 
research pertaining to the factors that affect inappropriate security behaviors (Teer, Kruk, 
& Kruk, 2007), further research was warranted to investigate the factors that affect the 
security practices and behaviors of smartphone users. 
Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy is originally rooted within the social-cognitive theory (SCT) 
developed by Bandura (1977). The SCT posits that output expectations and self-efficacy 
are the driving forces that influence behavior (Bandura, 1977; Compeau & Higgins, 
1995). Compeau and Higgins (1995) later adopted self-efficacy in the computer domain. 
They coined the new construct computer self-efficacy (CSE). CSE is defined as “an 
individual’s perception of his or her ability to use a computer in the accomplishment of a 
job task” (Compeau & Higgins, 1995, p. 193). CSE has been demonstrated as having 
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high reliability and validity in the studies of technology acceptance (Agarwal, 
Sambamurthy, & Stair, 2000; Park & Chen, 2007; Sheng, Pearson, & Crosby, 2003). 
CSE is often studied in conjunction with the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM) (Venkatesh & Davis, 1996; Fenech, 1998). Specifically, CSE has proven to have 
a significant impact on the perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use constructs of 
the TAM (Dishaw, Strong, & Bandy, 2002). CSE and the TAM, studied together, assist 
in gaining insight into users’ behaviors, perceptions, and attitudes (Chen, Chen, & Yen, 
2011). It has been repeatedly proven that CSE is a significant predictor in the adoption of 
new technologies (Ball, 2008). Ball (2008) discovered that CSE was one of the most 
important factors in determining user behavioral intention as it related to the acceptance 
and usage of technology. Several prior studies have indicated that CSE should be 
included when studying attitude and intention (Ong, Lai, & Wang, 2004; Vijayasarathy, 
2004; Yi & Hwang, 2003). 
Chen et al. (2011) conducted a study in an attempt to gain deeper insight into 
smartphone user perceptions about security and their application installation habits. They 
interviewed 60 participants and studied their willingness to perform certain actions on 
their smartphones such as mobile banking, online purchasing, and checking health 
records. They found that people were less willing to conduct those sensitive types of 
transactions on their smartphones as compared to their laptops. In their findings, they 
noted that there were misconceptions by the users concerning application security as well 
as the mobile network infrastructure (e.g., 3G & 4G data network). This finding raises 
concerns about self-efficacy and security risk awareness. They also discovered that 
proficiency, efficacy, and finely grained demographics may also be significant factors.  
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Rhee et al. (2009) stated that very little attention has been given to the socio-
cognitive behaviors of users regarding information security. Therefore, Rhee et al. 
investigated the relationship of information security self-efficacy and the resultant effects 
on information security, security practices, and motivation to strengthen security posture 
among computer users. Consistent with other published research articles, Rhee et al. 
argued that the end-users ultimately determine the overall security posture of computers 
and associated computer networks. The results of the study found that self-efficacy does 
in fact play a significant role in researching and explaining information security practices 
from a socio-cognitive perspective. Specifically, self-efficacy was found to play a 
positive role in overall security posture, level of concern about security incidents, and 
user intention to strengthen security posture.  
Moreover, Rhee et al. (2009) found that computer experience was a significant 
determinant in predicting information security self-efficacy. Furnell (2008) noted that 
inexperience poses a significant risk in security posture. He also argued that lack of 
awareness on specific threats, vulnerabilities, and risks were due to inexperience. Stanton 
et al. (2005) also noted that experience played a significant role in adopting good security 
practices.  
Crossler and Bélanger (2006) set out to investigate and determine the effects of 
CSE on the adoption of security tools through various levels of instruction. Crossler and 
Bélanger argued that although overall information system attacks and financial losses 
have decreased, unauthorized access and loss of personally identifiable and proprietary 
information is still on the rise. They further argued that individual differences affect a 
person’s use of technology. Therefore, Crossler and Bélanger set out to study the level of 
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self-reported CSE in relation to the level of security tool adoption. Additionally, Crossler 
and Bélanger tested, through quasi-experimentation, different information security 
instruction factors, awareness, training, and education, to test their applicability in the 
overall adoption rate of security tools as well as their impact on CSE. Crossler and 
Bélanger ultimately determined that awareness, training, and education did not have a 
significant impact on CSE or security tool adoption rate. However, the level of self-
reported CSE was highly significant in the overall adoption rate of security tool adoption. 
A literature review on smartphone self-efficacy has revealed that there is 
presently a literature gap as compared to the traditional computing domain; more so in 
regards to self-efficacy pertaining to security behaviors and practices of smartphone 
users. The majority of the literature that was discovered on smartphone self-efficacy was 
mainly focused on the adoption of the smartphone device itself (for example, see Keith, 
Babb, Furner, & Abdullat, 2011; Lee, 2014; Park & Chen, 2007), or the installation of 
applications from the respective smartphone marketplace for applications.  
Self-efficacy has evolved as new innovations have come to market. As previously 
noted, self-efficacy was discovered by Bandura (1977). Later, self-efficacy was adopted 
by Compeau and Higgins (1995) and applied to computers. Eastin and Rose (2000) 
adopted self-efficacy and applied it to the Internet, which they coined the new construct 
Internet self-efficacy. Therefore, it appears to be a feasible progression of using self-
efficacy construct in the context of smartphones. This study adopted self-efficacy in the 
mobile smartphone environment and titled the construct MISE. MISE was defined as an 
individual’s perception of his or her ability to protect themselves from attacks pertaining 
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to their smartphone. This study empirically assessed MISE and its validity and reliability 
in predicting user security practices and behaviors specific to smartphone devices. 
Awareness of Risks, Threats, and Vulnerabilities 
Users’ lack of information security awareness increases the risk of a malicious 
attack (Furnell, 2008). Information security awareness is imperative for anyone using the 
Internet (Shaw et al., 2009; Siponen, 2000). Yet, Bickford et al. (2010) noted users 
significantly lack information security awareness, specifically when using smartphones. 
Moreover, a December 2010 report published by the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA) stated the main risk to smartphones is lack of user awareness. 
A literature review on information security has shown that there is a common 
agreement that information security awareness is an important component in the overall 
security posture of an information system (Kruger & Kearny, 2006; Siponen, 2001; 
Straub & Welke, 1998). As Siponen (2001) noted, however, it is more than just user 
awareness, rather users have to be aware and commit to the security objectives. Siponen’s 
statement was later reaffirmed by Rezgui and Marks (2008) when they stated information 
security awareness is the “understanding of IS security and, optimally, committing to it” 
(p. 242).  
Since smartphones are a relatively new technology, users typically lack 
information security threat awareness (Chin et al., 2012). Additionally, many users are 
not even aware of the available countermeasures to information security risks (Furnell et 
al., 2008). Many users, even if aware of the technical solutions available, do not have the 
knowledge or expertise to configure and use them properly (Furnell, 2008). Kumar, 
Mohan, and Holowczak (2008) also suggested that there is a relationship between the 
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lack of awareness of security and the lack of adoption of the technological measures 
available to them. Unfortunately, as Kruger and Kearny (2006) noted, effective 
information security “requires a combination of technical and procedural controls to 
manage information risk” (p. 289). 
The nature of smartphone devices (i.e., ubiquitous, small form factor, & high 
usage) lends itself to not only the risks, threats, and vulnerabilities associated with 
traditional computing environments, but also those unique to smartphones (Jeon et al., 
2011). Numerous studies exist about the technical risks associated with smartphones; for 
example, privilege escalation attacks (Park et al., 2012), hacking and malware (Landman, 
2010), and rootkits, viruses, and worms (Bickford et al., 2010). Many of these same risks 
exist with traditional computing devices. However, as Bickford et al. noted, smartphone 
rootkits can access a number of unique interfaces and information that are not normally 
available on desktop computers, such as the GPS, battery, and voice/messaging, 
validating that smartphones create uniquely different security risks.  
For example, Jeon et al. (2011) identified a smartphone-specific attack called a 
dialer-attack. A dialer-attack is when malware infects the smartphone, hijacks the dialer 
function, and dials costly international phone numbers without the smartphone owner’s 
consent (Jeon et al., 2011). A similar threat exists that carries out similar actions, but uses 
text messaging instead of the dialer. Therefore, technical security precautions need to be 
implemented to mitigate these technical threats. Examples might include implementation 
of firewalls, antivirus software, and smartphone authentication measures. However, as 
Jeon et al. indicated, although there are very different and unique risks, threats, and 
vulnerabilities pertaining to smartphones, the user is the biggest vulnerability. 
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Responsibility of securing smartphone devices typically lies with the device 
owner. Since most smartphone devices are owned by individual users, regardless if they 
are used for work purposes, the responsibility to protect their sensitive data lies with the 
user (Allam, Flowerday, & Flowerday, 2014). However, many users do not believe it is 
their responsibility to protect themselves, which indicates a strong lack of awareness on 
the importance of users protecting themselves (Allam et al., 2014; Furnell et al., 2008).  
Furnell et al. (2007) conducted a study that investigated Internet users’ awareness 
of threats, awareness of security countermeasures, usage of those security 
countermeasures, and personal protection measures they practiced. They studied 20 
Internet users and found that many of the respondents had personally experienced some 
form of security attack and were aware of the existence of threats. However, many still 
failed to implement security countermeasures. Their findings also indicated that although 
many users claimed to be aware of security threats they were often associated with 
specific activities such as online banking rather than the actual threat, such as phishing, 
viruses, and malware. 
Many users turn to family or friends for assistance, as their ability to find suitable 
sources of information security protection are limited (Furnell et al., 2008). Furnell et al., 
(2008) examined Internet users’ source of knowledge as it pertains to Internet risks and 
associated barriers to protection. The study was qualitative in nature and was conducted 
using interviews of 20 novice Internet users. Novice users were specifically selected for 
this study as Furnell et al. conducted a previous study in which novice users were 
underrepresented. The results of the study found that users implement risky online 
practices, have significant online behavioral issues, and obtain their knowledge from less 
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than ideal sources. In addition to these results, key findings of this study were that users 
lack an understanding of specific threats and the available and appropriate safeguards, 
believe it is not their responsibility to protect themselves, and tend to exhibit a certain 
level of trust in software providers to provide the protection. Furnell et al. contended that 
a potential solution is to completely remove the protection decisions from users or to 
force the users into taking formal responsibility for their own protection. This suggests 
that the level of self-efficacy is low and may have a correlation to inadequate awareness 
of information security threats.  
Allam et al., (2014) set out to explore the factors that influence the fluctuating 
levels of information security awareness within business organizations. Allam et al. point 
out that many organizations are continually adapting a BYOD concept that is 
perpetuating smartphone information security risks. They argue that this perpetuation is 
attributable to the constant growth of smartphone usage and acceptance by organizations 
coupled with the lack of user knowledge or motivation to secure their smartphone. Allam 
et al. adapted Rasmussen’s (1997) awareness model and applied it to the smartphone 
information security domain. What Allam et al. found was that the managers, employees, 
and security professionals are competing against each other. Security professionals want 
the phone completely locked down. Managers want the least of amount of hurdles to 
increase productivity. Users want to reduce their workload by the maximum amount 
possible. Therefore, Allam et al. proposed a model that identifies an ‘optimized state’ of 
smartphone operation that equally balances the needs of security professionals, managers, 
and the employees. Allam et al. contend that if smartphone use is operated within this 
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area of ‘optimized state’, information security awareness will increase, which in turn will 
lead to more positive information security behaviors. 
 Muslukhov et al., (2013) investigated smartphone users’ perceived risks of 
unauthorized access of smartphone devices. Specifically, Muslukhov et al. studied 
perceived risks of unauthorized access by insider threats, such as friends and family, 
rather than outsider threats as has been the focus of other studies. The study found that 
users are more concerned with insider threats than outsider threats. Although not 
addressed in the paper, it can be surmised that this increased fear of insider threats could 
be attributable to the effects of long term “embarrassment.” The article studied the 
specific risks that smartphone users feared the most and found that unauthorized access to 
personal photos and videos was most feared. Consistent with other studies, this study 
found that only 52% of the respondents used a locking mechanism to deter unauthorized 
access to the device. Interestingly, Muslukhov et al. found that of those 52% of users that 
did employ a locking mechanism, 99% of them used a four-digit PIN or the draw-a-secret 
method. Several studies have shown that these are the two weakest forms of 
authentication and are subjected to several attacks such as shoulder surfing, 
eavesdropping, and smudge attacks. The users stated that they chose those authentication 
methods due to convenience. Muslukhov et al. suggest that smartphones need to integrate 
a logging system in order for the device owner to detect unauthorized access. It should be 
noted that the respondents were between the ages of 19-30 and over 90% were from the 
U.K. so generalization of the results is limited. 
Mylonas, Gritzalis, Tsoumas, and Apostolopoulos (2012) addressed specific 
security awareness differences between smartphone users that have information security 
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(IS) backgrounds versus users that do not. Unsurprisingly, Mylonas et al. found that users 
with IS backgrounds are more aware of security risks pertaining to smartphones. 
Moreover, Mylonas et al. also found that users with IS backgrounds thoroughly read and 
analyze End User License Agreements (EULA) and permission prompts compared to 
users without IS backgrounds. Where the behaviors between the two groups are similar is 
that both groups were found to be unaware if distributed applications were scrutinized for 
legitimacy or if the application was malware. Also, many users from both groups were 
found to have basic security features disabled on their phone such as a screen locking 
mechanism. Mylonas et al. found that smartphone security awareness was significantly 
lacking as well as research specifically tailored to smartphone security behaviors. They 
contended future research in smartphone security behaviors is warranted to raise 
awareness and to assist users with the challenges of smartphone security. 
In Furnell’s (2008) article, he described the need for increased information 
security and privacy awareness. Furnell argued that the proliferation of Internet 
applications, Websites, and computing devices has far outpaced the embracement of 
security practices and awareness. In other words, adoption of security practices has not 
kept pace with increased security risks. Furnell stated, "Users often know the threats are 
there, but fail to reflect this in their behavior" (p. 6). Additionally, he argued that security 
awareness is not reflective of the users’ online behaviors regarding sharing personal and 
sensitive information. The article also pointed out that this type of behavior is not only 
risky to organizations, but also from a personal perspective. Furnell also argued that it is 
more than just a lack of security awareness, but also the users' inability to understand the 
technicalities involved, such as how to keep anti-virus software current. Users’ lack of 
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technical aptitude presents significant challenges in protecting themselves from sensitive 
information disclosure. The main premise of this article was that reckless user behavior, 
lack of security awareness, and technological inexperience poses significant risks to both 
organizations and the user. 
Huang, Rau, and Salvendy (2010) set out to explore specific factors that affect the 
overall perception of information security (IS) among Internet users. Huang et al. argued 
that the human factor is significant in overall IS posture and that users view risks 
differently and, therefore, respond to threats differently. Moreover, Huang et al. noted 
that very little research has been conducted investigating the socio-cognitive behaviors 
behind IS behaviors. Huang et al. evaluated the responses to 21 common threats and their 
related outcomes. Huang et al. then conducted exploratory factor analysis (EFA), which 
resulted in a six factor structure: Knowledge, impact, severity, controllability, possibility, 
and awareness. It should be noted, however, that some factors had only ‘fair’ loadings of 
<0.5 but >0.4 and one factor loaded on more than one component. Among the most 
important results indicated are that computer experience played a significant role in IS 
perception, IS perception was related to the type of loss the threats brought, and that users 
showed little concern for personal information loss. 
Kruger and Kearney (2006) developed and tested a prototype for assessing 
InfoSec awareness in an organizational environment. The article stressed the importance 
of measuring IS awareness as a means of governance to assess the effectiveness of 
organizational IS programs. Kruger and Kearney noted that the increased reliance on 
information technology for conducting daily business operations makes it imperative for 
organizations to have effective IS programs. Lack of IS awareness can put an 
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organization at risk of information breaches. The key purpose of these programs is to 
ensure employees are keenly aware of the current state of risks. However, Kruger and 
Kearney argued that simply developing an organizational IS program is not enough. They 
contended that active governance and measurement of the program is necessary, 
specifically because end users are typically at the heart of IS program failures. Kruger 
and Kearney’s model measured three user components: knowledge, attitude, and behavior 
across five risk focus areas: company policy adherence, secret passwords, email/Internet 
caution, mobile equipment, and incident reporting. The results of the assessment showed 
promise in assessing overall organizational awareness, to include identifying specific 
areas for improvement. Particular to this case study, Kruger and Kearney found two risk 
focus areas scored poorly, adherence to policies and actions/consequences, which could 
be reassessed and modified to increase security awareness in those two categories. 
Albrectsen (2007) explored information technology (IT) users’ experiences and 
roles in overall information security (IS) within their organization. Consistent with the 
majority of published literature, Albrectsen states that users play a significant role in the 
overall effectiveness of IS programs. The results of this specific study found that users 
believed in the overall importance of IS programs. However, since the users had limited 
involvement, they did not feel like an important piece of the IS puzzle. Consequently, the 
users had little to no knowledge of current IS risks or mitigating techniques. Interestingly, 
although the IS program was fully documented and established within the organization, 
overall awareness was significantly lacking. This finding negates many other published 
research articles that claim documented and emphasized IS programs are key to 
increasing IS awareness. Through interviews, Albrectsen found a preference for a user-
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involved approach to the IS program to help the users grasp the gravity of IS risks and 
mitigation tools. As Albrectsen noted in his analysis, “mass media awareness campaigns 
had a low degree of influence on users” (p. 288). The results of this study cannot be 
generalized due to the small sample size chosen (N=19), as Albrectsen explained that the 
goal was to “not generalize but to interpret some users’ experience of information 
security” (p. 278). 
According to Rezgui and Marks (2008), the number of studies that undertake an 
in-depth look at IS awareness is limited. The majority of IS awareness is grounded within 
the computer domain. Siponen (2000) also noted the lack of studies in researching user 
behaviors and the determinants that result in decreased security practices. Moreover, 
Huang et al. (2010) stated that not only has very little research been conducted pertaining 
to the socio-cognitive behaviors behind IS security practices, but many studies only study 
a single factor. Huang et al. (2010) argued that several factors need to be investigated in 
order to gain a deeper understanding of the behaviors that drive the security practices of 
users. Additional factors they studied were threats and vulnerabilities in addition to risk. 
Huang et al. found that experience led to a greater awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, 
and risks, which all had significance in predicting user security practices. 
Trust 
Smartphones have dramatically changed the technological landscape. This 
dramatic change has led to unique ways for business to deliver their products, namely 
software applications. Wang and Emurian (2005) wrote that rapid advancements in 
technology would require businesses to seek new and alternative ways to deliver their 
products. As such, each individual smartphone platform (i.e., Android, iOS, Windows) 
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has developed its own “marketplace” for users to download software products from 
various manufacturers. These marketplaces are only applicable to handheld mobile 
devices such as smartphones and tablets and are specific to the operating system of the 
mobile device. Apple® devices, such as iPhone® and iPad®, use the iTunes® application 
market for downloads and purchasing. Whereas, the marketplace for application 
downloads and purchases for Android® based mobile devices is called the Play Store®. 
Unfortunately, some of the applications available in the marketplace are used to access 
and exploit personal information (Park et al., 2012). Since it may be difficult to obtain 
information regarding a vendor’s reputation outside of user reviews, the consumer may 
be forced to develop a certain level of trust (Mui, Mohtashemi, & Halberstadt, 2002). 
Trust has been studied in various disciplines such as psychology, management, 
sociology, and marketing to name a few. Trust is also an important research topic in an 
online context (Tan & Sutherland, 2004; Wang & Emurian, 2005). Studies of trust and 
perceived risk have been conducted in an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of 
consumer purchasing habits (Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). Trust and reputation are at the root 
of every transaction and are important research topics in many fields (Mui et al., 2002). 
For example, the probability is low of someone purchasing a vehicle from an auto dealer 
that has a notorious reputation for selling lemons. However, that same consumer may 
consider purchasing the vehicle from that dealer if they have trust in the brand of the 
vehicle they are buying. The same holds true when it comes to trust and reputation 
regarding electronic transactions. A consumer is unlikely to download or purchase a 
software application that has a reputation for buggy software and lack of customer 
service.  
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However, electronic marketplaces present new problems in consumer-seller 
relationship trust as compared to traditional brick-and-mortar marketplaces (Verhagen, 
Meents, & Tan, 2006). Therefore, consumers must depend solely on their perceptions of 
the marketplace in order to develop a certain level of trust (Verhagen et al., 2006). In 
addition to trusting the marketplace, the consumer must also trust the seller. 
Chin et al. (2012) conducted a study that measured user confidence in smartphone 
security. Chin et al. hypothesized that smartphone users do not fully accept and harness 
the computing power of smartphone devices due to users’ security and privacy concerns 
with smartphone devices. Chin et al. investigated smartphone users’ willingness to 
perform certain tasks and application discovery and installation decisions. Chin et al. 
interviewed 60 smartphone users and found that smartphone users are less willing to 
conduct tasks on their smartphones than on their laptops. The respondents indicated that 
they are more concerned about privacy and security on their smartphones due to specific 
fears associated with smartphone devices. The most prominent fears included smartphone 
loss/damage, data loss, and application trust. A key finding of this study were the 
misconceptions held by users regarding application security in the application stores as 
well as wireless and end-to-end security of the device. Chin et al. noted in their data, 
although they did not investigate further, that these misconceptions might be directly 
related to smartphone experience and proficiency. 
Ba and Pavlov (2002) stated, “Trust is a catalyst in many buyer-seller 
transactions…” (p. 244). Ba and Pavlov conducted a two-prong study to determine 
factors that may lead to an increased level of trust in order to conduct an online 
transaction. Ba and Pavlov developed a Webpage which mimicked eBay® for their two 
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studies. The first study set out to determine if positive or negative feedback from 
previous buyers was a determinant on purchases from a new buyer. The participant in the 
experiment was shown the Website with the positive and negative feedbacks, then asked 
to rate their level of trust with that seller. The positive and negative feedbacks were 
manipulated by Ba and Pavlov to determine any fluctuation in the levels of trust by the 
potential buyer. The second experiment was similar in nature. However, the second 
experiment focused on the sales price of the items. The results of the study showed that 
more positive feedback left by previous buyers led to an increase in overall trust by a new 
buyer. It also resulted in the willingness to pay a premium for the product. Suggested 
future work by Ba and Pavlov is a more in-depth analysis of antecedents of trust as it 
applies to online marketplaces. Additionally, they note that a limitation of the study was 
that the experiment was conducted in the context of auctions and future studies should 
examine different online marketplaces. 
Conversely, Lacohée, Phippen, and Furnell (2006) found that trust was not a 
factor in whether or not an online transaction was executed. This study assessed how 
users establish and perceive trust in executing online transactions. Lacohée et al. 
contended that assurance of security by online retailers prior to engaging in online 
transactions was not the motivating factor behind establishing a trust relationship about 
the transaction. Through open focus group question-and-answer sessions, Lacohée et al. 
accumulated response sets from online e-commerce users. Lacohée et al. found that it is, 
in fact, not the claim of security assurance that is a precursor of establishing trust. 
Moreover, Lacohée et al. found that many users were not even sure what the 
technological assurances meant. The results of the focus group determined that it was 
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more important to specify what they will do if and when the security breach occurs rather 
than making claims that it will not occur at all. Lacohée et al. also found that many times 
online transactions occur regardless of the trust factor. They found if the user was able to 
shift the risk, was assured of restitution if something occurred, or if the benefit 
outweighed the risk, the transaction would still be carried out. For example, users were 
found to purchase from unknown online retailers if a product price was cheaper than 
commonly known online retailers. Additionally, users felt that purchasing by credit card 
shifted the risk to the credit card company, which would refund the purchase price to the 
credit card if something went wrong. In summary, the results of this article showed that 
users conduct risky online behavior, especially if they perceive they will not be the 
victim. 
Mylonas et al. (2013) conducted interviews of 458 smartphone users. The results 
of the interviews found that 76% of the participants believed that the applications in the 
marketplace are secure. Moreover, approximately 75% of the users trusted the 
marketplace. However, Mylonas et al. found that users were completely unaware if 
applications in the application stores were scrutinized for legitimacy, despite trusting the 
marketplace where the applications are downloaded from. This is an indicator of possible 
blind trust in the application store. Moreover, Mylonas et al. found the majority of the 
participants believed all applications in the marketplace were secure. Their findings also 
suggest users who trust the application repository are typically not fully aware of 
smartphone security.  
Shin (2010) collected 397 responses from an online survey to test the effects of 
trust, security and privacy in social networking sites (SNS). The results of the study 
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found that trust was a significant factor in determining user attitude and intention in using 
SNS. However, it was noted that expertise might play a significant role in determining 
trust as it relates to attitude and intention. Future work should also consider specific 
precursors to trust.  
These studies indicate two possible different constructs that need further 
investigation: party trust and institutional trust. Sociologists believe trust stems from a 
social structure, which shapes the way people develop their beliefs in trust, often times 
referred to as institutional trust (Tan & Sutherland, 2004). A more precise definition of 
institutional trust as it relates to a smartphone is the trustworthiness of the intermediary 
operating the system (Verhagen et al., 2006).  
Party trust will focus on specific applications available in the online application 
stores. Institutional trust will focus on trust of the application stores themselves (p. 3). 
Verhagen et al. (2006) define party trust as “perceptions of trust in the counterpart of the 
transaction” (p. 3). Fung and Lee (1999) noted that trust has shown to have high 
significance in uncertain environments. Theoretically, smartphones could be categorized 
as an uncertain environment due to their relative newness to the computing field. 
Therefore, based on previous research findings that both of these constructs have shown 
to have a direct correlation on user behavior, this study will investigate their reliability 
and validity specific to smartphone user’s security practices and behaviors. 
Security Practices and Behaviors 
Botha et al. (2009) set out to explore the differences between desktop computing 
security mechanisms as compared to smartphone security mechanisms. Botha et al. 
contended that significant differences, in user security behaviors as well as available 
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security tools, create a state of confusion for the users as well as lack of knowledge 
pertaining to smartphone security. Moreover, Botha et al. pointed out that smartphone 
devices create new security risks due to lack of use and availability of authentication 
methods, lack of physically controlled environments, and small form factor of the 
smartphone leading to increased loss and theft of the device. Botha et al. also noted that 
there are significantly different communication means that also need to be protected and 
manually configured by the device user, which can also lead to an increase in security 
vulnerabilities. Botha et al. contended that users need to be more aware of the limitations 
in smartphone functionality as compared to their desktop environment in order to gain a 
deeper understanding on how users can better protect themselves. 
Ben-Asher et al. (2011) argued that the lack of authentication method 
implementation is largely based on smartphone users security needs, awareness of and 
concern for security risks, and levels of perceived sensitivity of data stored or logged on 
the smartphone. Moreover, Ben-Asher et al. stated that the small form factor of the 
device makes it inherently more susceptible to loss or theft, which can result in the risk of 
sensitive data compromise that is magnified by lack of awareness of available security 
mechanisms. In addition to lack of awareness, Ben-Asher et al. also noted that many 
users will simply not utilize the available security mechanisms due to the perceived 
inconvenience of authenticating. The results of the survey indicated that many 
smartphone users desired authentication methods that were more convenient but still 
offered substantial security adequacy. Ben-Asher et al. argued for “graded” security 
levels, which would be better termed “graduated” security levels, in which there are 
different levels of access determined by authentication type. For example, if no means of 
38 
 
 
 
authentication is provided, the user may be granted basic telephone privileges, but not the 
ability to gain access to the Internet or download and install third-party applications.  
Botha, Furnell, and Clarke (2009) addressed the differences between desktop 
computing security mechanisms as compared to smartphone security mechanisms. Botha 
et al. contend that significant differences in both user security behaviors, as well as 
available security tools, creates a state of confusion for the users as well as lack of 
knowledge pertaining to smartphone security. Moreover, Botha et al. point out that 
smartphone devices create new security risks due to lack of authentication methods used 
and available, lack of physically controlled environments, and small form factor of the 
smartphone leading to increased loss and theft of the device. Botha et al. also noted that 
there are significantly different communication means that also need to be protected and 
manually configured by the device user, which can also lead to an increase in security 
vulnerabilities. Botha et al. contend that users need to become more aware of the 
limitations presented in smartphone devices as compared to their desktop environment in 
order to gain a deeper understanding on how users can better protect themselves. 
In the article by Van Bruggen et al. (2013), the authors address the need for 
increased security conscious behavior among smartphone users. Van Bruggen et al. note 
that user owned smartphones are becoming more widely accepted into the workplace in 
order to facilitate work-related transactions, such as email while away from the office. 
This increased acceptance by organizations leads to organizational proprietary 
information being stored and transmitted on the smartphone devices and the lack of 
security conscious behaviors creates a significant risk. They found that many users do not 
even enable screen locking mechanism while the phone is not in use. Therefore, Van 
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Bruggen et al. tested an intervention method that focused on three different motivational 
angles -- deterrence, morality, and incentives -- in an attempt to increase security 
conscious behaviors by smartphone users; specifically, locking the phone and 
periodically changing their password. For those users that did lock their phone, Van 
Bruggen et al. found deterrence produced the most immediate results, whereas, morality 
produced more long term results. The results of the study found that for users who did not 
lock their phone, it was extremely difficult to change their behavior. Thus, it can be 
inferred that regardless of attempts to modify behaviors, users will still openly expose 
themselves and their organizations to information security risks. 
Mylonas, Kastania, and Gritzalis (2012) addressed smartphone application 
repositories, such as Google’s “Play Store” and Apple’s “App Store” as breeding grounds 
for attackers to distribute malicious software. Mylonas et al. pointed out that the 
increased popularity of smartphone devices becoming more deeply entrenched in society 
has resulted in exponential application downloads from the official application 
repositories. Mylonas et al. argued that due to lack of security and privacy controls at the 
application repository level, the burden of security decisions has been placed on the 
smartphone user. Mylonas et al. explored the smartphone user’s security awareness of the 
applications within the repositories in an attempt to build a prediction model to identify 
users that trust the application repositories. Mylonas et al. observed that users considered 
less computer savvy are more likely to download and install applications with total 
disregard of security and privacy implications. However, it should be noted that Mylonas 
et al. reported a Cronbach of only (α=.506) and the majority of their survey consisted of 
only two-item measures. 
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In the article by Furnell et al. (2007), they assessed Internet users’ familiarity and 
knowledge of security threats and associated security protection tools. Furnell et al. 
argued that users’ awareness concerning IT security threats and available security 
protection tools is a major cause for concern. The level of significance of this lack of 
awareness and protection can be summed up in the statement by Furnell et al., 
“Compromised home systems have the potential to perpetuate problems for the Internet 
community as a whole” (p. 410). Therefore, Furnell et al. surveyed 415 Internet users and 
measured their knowledge of threats, knowledge of available security tools, use of 
security tools, and knowledge of configuring the security tools. The results show that 
there is scant knowledge of the risks among the majority of respondents. However, there 
is a divergence between this knowledge and the knowledge of available security 
applications, their use, and configurations. This finding is more prevalent among novice 
users. Furnell et al. pointed out it is more of a concern that many users who considered 
themselves advanced computer users also lacked the knowledge to implement and 
configure the appropriate security controls. Therefore, the results showed that users do 
pose a significant risk to themselves and the rest of the online community through their 
lack of understanding and overconfidence in their abilities. 
Summary 
In summary, this study contended, based on prior research, that several factors 
have a significant impact on the overall user security practices and behaviors. Although 
the majority of the articles studying IS security practice behaviors and practices are 
grounded in the domain of traditional computing, the gap in literature between traditional 
computing and smartphone security is significant and requires more research. As such, 
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based on the works of Chen et al. (2011), Chin et al. (2012), Furnell (2008), Furnell et al. 
(2008), Rhee et al. (2009), and Stanton et al. (2005), this study posited that VA, RA, TA, 
MISE, IT, and PT all have a significant role in smartphone users’ security practices (SP) 
and behaviors (SB).  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the approach and methodology that was used to conduct 
the study. First, the approach to the study will be discussed, followed by the specific 
propositions, survey development, and, finally, how the study was executed and 
analyzed. 
Approach 
This study was confirmatory in nature and employed previously validated 
constructs from the domain of computer security and attempted to confirm their 
reliability and validity in the context of smartphones. This study utilized a Web-based 
survey to collect and store data electronically using Google® Forms. The survey was 
disseminated through Facebook® and LinkedIn® social media outlets. The main research 
question this study proposed to address was: Do the factors of MISE, VA, TA, RA, IT 
and PT, demonstrate high reliability and validity in determining smartphone users’ 
security practices and security behaviors? To address this question a theoretical model 
(figure 2) was developed using previously validated constructs identified during literature 
review pertaining to computer security. The approach to this study is depicted in figure 3. 
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Figure 2. Theoretical Framework. 
 
 
Figure 3. Research model. 
Propositions 
The propositions that this study analyzed were: 
P1:  Vulnerability awareness (VA) positively impacts mobile information 
security efficacy (MISE). 
P2:  Threat awareness (TA) positively impacts mobile information security 
efficacy (MISE). 
P3: Risk awareness (RA) positively impacts mobile information security 
efficacy (MISE). 
P4:  Institutional trust (IT) positively impacts mobile information security 
efficacy (MISE). 
P5:  Party trust (PT) positively impacts mobile information security efficacy 
(MISE). 
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P6:  Mobile information security efficacy (MISE) positively impacts security 
practices (SP). 
P7:  Mobile information security efficacy (MISE) positively impacts security 
behaviors (SB). 
Instrument Development 
Mobile Infosec Self-efficacy 
This study measured user’s MISE using the previously validated 11-item 
construct used by Rhee et al. (2010) in measuring InfoSec self-efficacy. This study 
adopted all 11 items and reworded them, as item number six is not applicable to 
smartphones. The items were tailored to smartphone-specific features. MISE was 
measured using a 7-point Likert scale, where 1 indicated “completely not confident” and 
7 indicated “completely confident”.  
Vulnerability, Threat, and Risk Awareness 
This study measured users’ VA, TA, and RA based on the unpublished work of 
Simpson, Nilsen, Levy, and Cohen (2014). Simpson et al. (2014) studied factors that 
affected perceived information security risks of smartphone users. The study found very 
high reliability with strong Cronbach α values above 0.9 with all three constructs. Risk 
had eight items, threat had seven items, and vulnerability had nine items. All constructs 
were measured using a 7-point Likert scale where 1 indicated “completely unaware” and 
7 indicated “completely aware.”  
Institutional and Party Trust 
This study used the previously validated constructs of party trust and institutional 
trust developed by Verhagen et al. (2006). Each construct contained measurement items 
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that exhibited high reliability with a Cronbach α of 0.89 for institutional trust and 0.92 for 
party trust. The items were adapted for this study and slightly modified to put them into 
smartphone context. Each item was based on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 indicated 
“completely disagree” and 7 indicated “completely agree.”  
Security Practices and Behaviors 
Rhee et al. (2009) studied two different types of security constructs: security 
practices (SP) and security behaviors (SB). This study used these two previously 
validated constructs. SB focused on actual behaviors of smartphone users such as online 
banking and willingly sharing PII. SP focused on the technical aspect of smartphone 
security such as the usage of anti-virus and anti-malware programs, and locking the 
phone when not in use. Both constructs consisted of eight measurable items. The items in 
the security practices construct were measured using “yes”, “no”, and “I don’t know” 
answers. This study adopted five of the eight items in the SP construct and consisted of 
“yes” and “no” answers and was repurposed into the context of smartphones. Of the eight 
measurable items of the SB construct, six were adopted, again with slight variations to 
the wording to put them into smartphone context, and consisted of “yes” and “no” 
answers. Smartphone-specific features pertaining to locking the device when not in use 
were also added.  
Expert Panel 
After the literature review was completed, a preliminary survey instrument was 
developed. The survey instrument was then disseminated to an expert panel consisting of 
six members with terminal degrees in the IS field or information security backgrounds. 
The purpose of the expert panel was to evaluate the applicability, precision, and clarity of 
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the questions, known as content validity, and is consistent with the approach of Straub 
(1989). The goal behind the expert review was to identify any necessary adjustments to 
the survey instrument such as removing unnecessary items, question modifications, and 
or layout of survey. The preliminary survey instrument was distributed via email to the 
expert panel members and they were given 1 week to provide their qualitative analysis of 
the instrument. The feedback from all six panel members was taken into consideration. 
Most of the feedback was consistent between all six members. The feedback consisted of 
only minor issues such as removing question marks, misspellings, adding more 
definitions to the measurement items, and changing the wording for the responses. All the 
feedback was incorporated due to panel consensus. Since all six members submitted 
nearly identical feedback, the survey instrument was not redistributed to the expert panel. 
Reliability 
Establishing reliability is critical in the research process. Reliability is 
documenting the internal consistency of the variables, or set of variables, that they are 
intended to measure (Straub, Rai, & Klein, 2004). Cronbach α is the most commonly 
used measure to determine reliability of a survey instrument (Sekeran, 2003; Mertler & 
Vannatta, 2013). According to Mertler and Vannatta (2013) and Hair, Anderson, Tatham, 
and Black (1998), a Cronbach α value must meet or exceed 0.7 to be deemed reliable. 
Most of the constructs in this study are being repurposed from the traditional computing 
domain to the smartphone domain. The constructs were previously confirmed as reliable. 
However, due to the repurposing effort being undertaken in this study, Cronbach α was 
used to determine reliability of the constructs and are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Validity 
Internal Validity 
According to Levy (2006), there are typically three categories of validity that 
need to be addressed: internal, external, and instrument. Confirming internal validity is 
the process of ruling out alternative explanations of dependent variables that are not 
explainable by the independent variables (Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004). Through 
extensive literature reviews, this study used previously validated constructs from existing 
literature that demonstrated strong causal relationships between the constructs. Moreover, 
an expert panel was established to review the instrument to ensure representativeness and 
meaningfulness of the measures. Thus, this study is considered to have high internal 
validity. 
External validity 
 External validity pertains to how the results of the study can be generalized 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). The targeted audience was representative of the smartphone 
population in terms of demographics, age, and gender. The survey was administered to 
539 people. A total of 275 responses were collected for a response rate of over 50%. 
Thus, the results of this study are generalizable and external validity is considered high.  
Instrument validity 
Instrument validity was addressed through both extensive literature review and an 
expert panel to ensure content and construct validity of the instrument. The expert panel 
was used to assess the content and construct related validity, helping to ensure the 
proposed items are appropriate to what this study intends to measure. Moreover, the 
expert panel was used to ensure there were not any ambiguities or redundancies and that 
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the instrument asks appropriate questions that are encompassing of what this study 
intended to measure. There were minor tweaks to the questions based on expert panel 
feedback. Based on expert panel feedback and extensive literature review, instrument 
validity is considered high. 
Population and Sample 
This study was disseminated through social media outlets of Facebook® and 
LinkedIn®. Previous work by Simpson, Nilsen, Levy, and Cohen (2014) disseminated a 
survey instrument through Facebook® which resulted in an approximate response rate of 
30% and the respondents were representative of the population. Therefore, this study 
used the same means of survey distribution. The user base of this survey was distributed 
to 539 users. The response rate was 50.6%. Carefully crafted reminders were used to 
keep ongoing participant recruitment until the 250 minimum required responses to 
conduct the statistical analysis were met. 
A review of the literature had revealed vastly different views on the minimum 
sample size required for CFA and SEM. For CFA, Gorsuch (1983) recommends a sample 
size of at least 100; whereas, Comrey and Lee (1992) recommend between 200 and 300 
samples. For SEM, Weston and Gore (2006) suggest a minimum of 200 samples. Based 
on literature reviews to conduct CFA-SEM the response rate met the generally published 
guidelines of N>200 allowing for a sufficient sample of the population. The response rate 
also allowed for any exclusion of data that may be necessary due to missing data, 
response set, and outliers, while still maintaining enough responses for a valid statistical 
analysis. 
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Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
Pre-analysis data screening is the process of detecting and dealing with problems 
with collected data (Levy, 2006). Some of these problems consist of missing data, 
response set, outliers, linearity, and skewness or kurtosis (non-normality). Therefore, to 
ensure the validity of the results, the researcher must thoroughly check the validity of the 
data (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013). The Web-enabled survey this study used had required 
responses that eliminated missing data and transcription errors. Scatter plots, discussed in 
Chapter 4, were used to examine linearity and normality. Mahalanobis Distance (MD), 
also discussed in Chapter 4, was used to determine any extreme outliers. Each case was 
then further scrutinized to determine the necessity of possible removal of the response 
case. 
Data Analysis 
After pre-analysis data screening, CFA was conducted. The purpose behind 
conducting CFA is to confirm or refute support for an a priori theory (Mertler & 
Vannatta, 2013). A hypothesized model is developed and used by the researcher in an 
attempt to estimate a covariance matrix of a population and compare that to the observed 
covariance matrix (Schrieber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). Utilizing CFA has 
shown to be ideal for testing the validity of proposed constructs based off of previously 
published literature (Gallaspy, 1996). CFA is used to analyze the validity of the fitness of 
a proposed model. According to Shumacker and Lomax (2010) and Levy and Green 
(2009), the most commonly reported fitness criteria in CFA are Chi Square (CMIN/df), 
goodness of fit index (GFI), adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI), root-mean-square-of-
approximation (RMSEA), root mean square residual (RMR) and standardized RMR 
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(SRMSR). Post CFA, further data analysis was conducted using an SEM technique to test 
the relationships and significance between the constructs.  
Resources 
Google Forms was used to develop the survey and collect the data from the 
survey participants. The survey was distributed through Facebook® and LinkedIn®. 
Once the data were collected, Statistical Package for Social Sciences® (SPSS), AMOS, 
and Microsoft Excel were used to analyze the data.  
Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the approach and methodology that this 
study used. This study was quantitative in nature and utilized an online survey hosted on 
Google Forms. The purpose of this study was to conduct CFA of previously validated 
constructs from existing literature in the traditional computing domain and test their 
applicability to smartphone security domain. The methods that were used to test the 
propositions and address the main research question stated in this study included a 
literature review, instrument development, expert panel, data collection, and analysis. 
The survey was disseminated though LinkedIn® and Facebook ® and resulting in 275 
total responses. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
Introduction 
This chapter details the data analysis and the results of the current study. This 
chapter includes an analysis of the data collection process, analytical statistical methods 
used, and the overall results. First, the results of the expert panel will be discussed 
followed by the results of the pre-analysis data screening and then the results of the 
quantitative phase. The chapter then concludes with a summary of the results and the 
procedures utilized for the analysis. 
Survey Analysis 
Through extensive literature review of scholarly articles pertaining to computer 
security, a preliminary survey was developed (Appendix A). This survey was developed 
using Google Forms and consisted of previously validated factors from existing literature 
in computer security. The survey was developed in order to provide a means to collect 
data in order to statistically analyze the theoretical model for reliability and validity in the 
context of smartphones. Additionally, the data from the survey was used to test for causal 
relationships in the structural equation model between the factors as noted in the 
proposed propositions in Chapter 3. The data was also used to answer the main research 
question: Do the factors of mobile InfoSec self-efficacy (MISE), vulnerability awareness 
(VA), threat awareness (TA), risk awareness (RA), institutional trust (IT), and party trust 
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(PT) demonstrate high reliability and validity in determining smartphone users’ security 
practices (SP) and security behaviors (SB)?  
Expert Panel 
Before disseminating the survey to the general population for data collection, the 
survey was sent to an expert panel to review for consistency, ambiguities, redundancies, 
and to ensure the questions were encompassing of the data this survey intended to collect. 
The survey was sent via email (Appendix B) to six people that had terminal degrees in 
information systems and/or had information security backgrounds and were currently 
working in information security positions. All six people participated in the survey 
review. The feedback was positive and only included minor tweaks such as rewording the 
answers, minor spelling mistakes, and punctuation. As a result, a final survey instrument 
(Appendix C) was developed and disseminated to the general population via Facebook® 
and LinkedIn® for data collection.  
Survey Responses 
The active data collection effort began on June 19th, 2015, and continued until 
June 27th, 2015. Study participants were able to access and complete the online survey 
for a total of eight days. The survey was turned off after responses were no longer being 
obtained. The total potential respondent base via Facebook® and LinkedIn® was 539 
potential respondents. Of the 539 potential respondents, 275 total responses were 
collected at a collection rate of 50.6%. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Before testing the propositions, pre-analysis data screening was conducted in 
order to ensure the data was reliable, useful, and valid. The data screening process 
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reported below included tests for: missing data, response sets, outliers, normality, and 
multicollinearity.  
Missing Data 
As previously noted in Chapter 3, all the questions in the survey were marked as 
required questions. A respondent could not submit the survey unless all questions were 
answered. If a respondent did not answer a question, a prompt required that the missed 
question be answered before submitting. As such, there was no missing data in the 
survey. 
Response Set 
Response set is an unengaged respondent meaning that the respondent simply 
answered the same way throughout the entire survey. Response set is detected through 
visual inspection of the data. Through visual inspection of the data for this study, 13 
response sets (cases 7, 16, 21, 41, 107, 112, 124, 130, 193, 217, 233, 239, and 247) were 
detected and eliminated from further data analysis. Removing these 13 responses resulted 
in 262 responses for further analysis. 
Outliers 
Next, univariate and multivariate outliers were tested. Univariate outliers are 
cases with extreme values on only one of the factors (standardized scores in excess of +/- 
3.29), whereas cases with extreme values on two or more factors are considered 
multivariate outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The Z scores for each variable were 
calculated and no variable exceeded the +/-3.29 threshold. Thus, no univariate outliers 
were detected. To detect multivariate outliers within the data set, Mahalanobis Distance 
was calculated. There were six total multivariate outliers identified (cases 31, 110, 120, 
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151, 162, and 233) that were removed from further analysis leaving a final tally of 256 
responses to analyze. 
Normality 
To test for normality, the data were analyzed for skewness and kurtosis. First, 
histograms were developed and assessed to visually determine any skewness or kurtosis 
issues. Reviewing the histograms did not reveal any significant non-normality issues. 
Second, the numeric results were also analyzed for any skewness or kurtosis issues. The 
numeric results showed that skewness was within acceptable levels of absolute value of 2 
(Terrell, 2012). Additionally, the numeric results did not show any kurtosis issues as all 
values fell below the kurtosis threshold of 2.2 (Sposito et. al., 1983; Terrell, 2012). Thus, 
no significant non-normality issues were discovered. 
Multicollinearity 
Although there are several ways to detect multicollinearity, two of the most 
common statistical analyses to discover the potential problem are through examination of 
Pearson bivariate correlations and variance inflation factors (VIFs) (Mertler & Vannatta, 
2014). Therefore, these two analyses were computed to determine the presence of 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is when two or more factors are highly correlated to 
each other (r >.90) because the two factors contain redundant information, thus measure 
the same thing (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). None of the factors exceeded .828 as 
depicted in Table 1. This is below the defined r <.90 threshold (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). None of the VIF scores (Tables 2-5) exceeded 3.20, which is well under the 
defined threshold of 10.00 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). Through these two 
calculations it was determined that multicollinearity was not an issue. 
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Table 1. Pearson Coefficient (N = 256) 
  COMB_SP 
COMB_
SB 
COMB_
MISE 
COMB
_RA 
COMB_
VA 
COMB_
TA 
COMB_
IT 
COMB_
PT 
Comb_SP 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .225
** .276** .243** .373** .357** -0.059 -0.096 
Sig. (2-
tailed)   0 0 0 0 0 0.349 0.127 
Comb_SB 
Pearson 
Correlation .225
** 1 .223** 0.093 .152* .146* 0.067 -0.05 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0   0 0.139 0.015 0.02 0.289 0.428 
COMB_MISE 
Pearson 
Correlation .276
** .223** 1 .689** .794** .752** .230** .352** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 
COMB_RA 
Pearson 
Correlation .243
** 0.093 .689** 1 .760** .828** 0.113 .229** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0 0.139 0   0 0 0.071 0 
COMB_VA 
Pearson 
Correlation .373
** .152* .794** .760** 1 .813** .151* .262** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0 0.015 0 0   0 0.016 0 
COMB_TA 
Pearson 
Correlation .357
** .146* .752** .828** .813** 1 .157* .234** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0 0.02 0 0 0   0.012 0 
COMB_IT 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.059 0.067 .230
** 0.113 .151* .157* 1 .733** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.349 0.289 0 0.071 0.016 0.012   0 
COMB_PT 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.096 -0.05 .352
** .229** .262** .234** .733** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 0.127 0.428 0 0 0 0 0   
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 2. Mobile InfoSec Self-Efficacy VIF 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 COMP_VA .338 2.962 
COMP_TA .311 3.220 
COMP_RA .355 2.816 
a. Dependent Variable: COMP_MISE 
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Table 3. Risk Awareness VIF 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 COMB_MISE .396 2.525 
COMB_VA .309 3.237 
COMB_TA .355 2.814 
a. Dependent Variable: COMB_RA 
 
Table 4. Threat Awareness VIF 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 COMP_VA .324 3.086 
COMP_MISE .410 2.437 
COMP_RA .421 2.375 
a. Dependent Variable: COMP_TA 
 
 
Table 5. Vulnerability Awareness VIF 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 COMP_MISE .465 2.152 
COMP_RA .381 2.622 
COMP_TA .338 2.962 
a. Dependent Variable: COMP_VA 
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Descriptives 
After removing problematic responses discovered in the pre-analysis data 
screening, there were a total of 256 responses left for analysis. Table 6 provides a brief 
overview of the respondent descriptive statistics. 
Table 6. Descriptives Table (N = 256) 
    Frequency Percentage  
Gender Male 116 45.3% 
  Female 140 54.7% 
    Frequency Percentage  
Education High School 17 6.6% 
  Some College 71 27.7% 
  Associate 45 17.6% 
  Bachelor 80 31.3% 
  Graduate 43 16.8% 
    Frequency Percentage  
Marital Status Single 35 13.7% 
  Married 174 68.0% 
  Divorced 38 14.8% 
  Widowed 3 1.2% 
  Separated 6 2.3% 
    Frequency Percentage 
IS Background Yes 103 40.2% 
  No 153 59.8% 
    Frequency Percentage  
Operating System Android 142 55.5% 
  iPhone 106 41.4% 
  Windows 3 1.2% 
  Blackberry 1 0.4% 
  Unknown 4 1.6% 
    Frequency Percentage  
Age 18-24 18 7% 
  25-34 61 24% 
  35-44 77 30% 
  45-54 54 21% 
  55+ 46 18% 
  Min/Max Mean Std Dev 
Years experience 1/20 7.071 4.1862 
 
There was a fairly even distribution in gender with 55% female responses compared to 
45% male responses (Table 6). Over 93% of the respondents reported having post-high 
school education. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents reported that they were married. 
The majority of the respondents (60%) reported not having an IS background. Nearly 
56% of the respondents reported Android as their phone’s operating system, whereas 
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41% reported owning the iPhone. The ages of the respondents were relatively distributed 
with the largest age group reporting to be between the ages of 35 to 44. The average 
number of years that participants reported having a smartphone was 7.07 years (SD = 
4.19). 
 Additionally, descriptive statistics was also conducted on the dependent factors of 
security practices and security behaviors in order to obtain a deeper insight to the overall 
practices and behaviors of the respondents (Table 7). Security Practices is defined as the 
technological aspect that a user takes (i.e., installing security applications) to protect their 
mobile device (Rhee et al., 2009). With exception to spam filters on email clients, the 
majority of the respondents exhibit very poor security practices. Conversely, the majority 
of the respondents exhibit very good security behaviors, which is defined as the security 
conscious behavior and actions that users demonstrate while using their mobile device 
(Rhee et al., 2009). 
Table 7. Security Practices and Behaviors Descriptive Statistics 
Security Practices Yes No 
1. Do you currently have antivirus software on your smartphone?  49% 51% 
2. Do you currently have email spam filter installed on your 
smartphone?  56% 44% 
3. Do you currently have antispyware on your smartphone?  47% 53% 
4. Do you currently have a firewall installed on your smartphone?  30% 70% 
5. Do you currently have any sort of encryption installed on your 
smartphone?  33% 67% 
   Security Behaviors 
  1. Do you use file sharing software (Kazaa, EDonkey, etc.) from 
your smartphone?  4% 96% 
2. Do you make backup copies of your files from your smartphone?  58% 42% 
3. Do you have sensitive documents such as medical, financial, or 
banking stored on your smartphone?  20% 80% 
4. Does your smartphone require some form of authentication (PIN, 
Password, Pattern) before getting access?  78% 22% 
5. When transferring data on the Internet from your smartphone do 
you check to see if the site is secured?  66% 34% 
6. Have you shared your smartphone with other people?  21% 79% 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was the next step in the data analysis phase. 
The purpose behind conducting CFA is to confirm or disconfirm support for an a priori 
theory (Mertler & Vannatta, 2013). Steps involved in CFA are model specification, 
model estimation, review of the results, and sometimes model respecification. (Brown & 
Moore, 2015).  
For model specification, an initial CFA model (Appendix F), based on the 
theoretical model (Figure 2) described in Chapter 3, was developed in AMOS. The 
diagram is depicted using latent factors (ovals), with observed, measured items 
(rectangles) on the latent factors, and measurement errors (circles) set on each observed 
item. AMOS requires that one of the regression loadings for each latent variable is set to 
a restrained regression weight of 1.00 in the model in order to tie the other measured 
items to this specific reference point (Kline, 2005). Finally, covariances between each of 
the latent factors were set in order to estimate the relationship between the latent factors 
(Brown & Moore, 2015). 
Model estimation, according to Brown and Moore (2015), “is an analysis used to 
find a set of parameter estimates that produces a predicted variance-covariance matrix 
that best reproduces the input variance-covariance matrix” (p. 12).  Maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimator was used during model estimation as this “maximizes the probability of 
observing the available data if the data were collected again from the same population” 
(Brown & Moore, 2015, p. 14). After initial computation of the CFA, all factor loadings 
of the observed factors on the latent factors were .70 or higher. However, the results of 
the model fit estimation conducted on the initial CFA model did not result in acceptable 
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model fit indices (Table 8). The ratio of Chi-Square (X2) to degrees of freedom (df) 
(reported as CMIN/DF) is 3195.70/845 = 3.782. This exceeds the established threshold of 
CMIN/DF ≤ 3 by Schumacker and Lomax (2010) and is indicative of poor model fit. 
Other commonly reported model fit indices produced by the initial model, also had poor 
results. Goodness of fit (GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI) at .61 and .57, 
respectively, came in below standard thresholds of >.9 and >.8, respectively. Root mean 
square of approximation (RMSEA) at 0.10 was right on the threshold of <0.10. Standard 
root mean residual (SRMR) at .04 indicates excellent model fit. However, caution must 
be exercised in reporting model fit based on specific model fit indices. Hooper, 
Coughlan, and Mullen (2008) noted that GFI and AGFI are sensitive to sample sizes. In 
large sample sizes and complex models, GFI and AGFI are almost always 
underestimated. This study uses a complex model with eight latent factors and has a 
sample size of 256. Therefore, RMSEA and SRMR are better model fit indices for a 
study of this complexity and sample size. Considering all indices combined, this model 
can only be considered a fair fit. 
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Table 8. Overall Fit Indices for Initial CFA Model 
Goodness of Fit Measure Recommended Value 
Values from 
this study 
Chi-square (X2) 
 
3195.70 
Degrees of freedom (df) 
 
845 
Chi-square/df (CMIN/DF) <3.00 3.782 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) >.90 0.617 
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI) >.80 0.571 
Normalized-Fit Index (NFI)* ≥.90 0.835 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)* ≥.90 0.864 
Comparative-Fit Index (CFI)* ≥.90 0.873 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) <.10 0.044 
Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA) <.10 0.104 
Parsimonious Goodness-of-Fit Index (PGFI) higher the better 0.551 
Parsimonious Normed-Fit Index (PNFI) higher the better 0.781 
  
 
  
Source: Levy and Green (2009); Schumacker and Lomax (2010) 
 * Values only important in SEM analysis (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008) 
 
Reliability and Validity 
The most commonly evaluated and reported reliability and validity indices are 
composite reliability (CR), average variance extracted (AVE), maximum shared variance 
(MSV), and average shared variance (ASV) (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). CR 
is reported for reliability, AVE is reported for convergent validity, and MSV, ASV, and 
the square root of AVE are reported for discriminate validity. The thresholds for these 
indices are depicted in Table 9.  
Table 9. Reliability and Validity Thresholds 
Measure Threshold 
CR >.70 
AVE >.50 
MSV MSV < AVE 
ASV ASV < AVE 
√AVE > inter-construct correlations 
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Table 10 provides the reliability and validity values for the estimated model for 
this study. All CR scores were greater than .9, all AVE scores were greater than .5, MSV 
and ASV scores were lower than AVE and the square root of AVE exceeded the scores of 
all inter-construct correlations. Since all scores exceeded the established thresholds, it 
was determined that the criteria had been met in order to determine construct reliability as 
well as convergent and discriminate validity (Kaartina et al., 2015).  
Table 10. Reliability and Validity Table with Square Root AVE on Diagonal 
 
CR AVE MSV ASV VA IT PT TA RA MISE 
VA 0.939 0.795 0.659 0.389 0.892           
IT 0.981 0.928 0.576 0.134 0.130 0.963         
PT 0.981 0.929 0.576 0.172 0.248 0.759 0.964       
TA 0.971 0.871 0.659 0.363 0.812 0.120 0.197 0.934     
RA 0.968 0.882 0.613 0.343 0.783 0.096 0.222 0.766 0.939   
MISE 0.928 0.683 0.593 0.351 0.770 0.233 0.366 0.718 0.676 0.826 
 
Model Respecification 
Model respecification was conducted due to the poor model fit indices reported in 
the initial model evaluation. The first step in the model respecification process was to 
view the standardized residuals matrix. Any value over 1.96 indicates factor cross 
loadings of the observed items onto multiple factors (Brown & Moore, 2015). There were 
four observed items (MISE 1, MISE 6, VA 2, and TA 7) with values over 1.96 in the 
standardized residual matrix and removed from further analysis. 
 The second step in the model respecification process was to visually inspect the 
modification indices (MI) matrix for any values over 20 between the error terms within 
the same factor. Modification indices are computed values that reflect how much Chi-
square over degrees of freedom (CMIN/DF) will decrease by covarying the error terms 
within the same factor (Arbuckle, 2007; Brown & Moore, 2015). This was an iterative 
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process until all MI were within a reasonable level of less than 20. A significant amount 
of time was not spent on reducing Chi-square values since Chi-square is particularly 
sensitive to larger sample sizes and almost always results in rejecting the hypothesis 
while conducting CFA (Chan, Lee, Lee, Kubota & Allen, 2007; Kline, 2005; Hox, 1997).  
The model respecification resulted in a moderate increase in model fit as 
compared to the initial CFA model (Table 11). CMIN/DF at 1529.67/670 = 2.283 
indicates acceptable model fit despite the tendency of CMIN/DF to be overestimated for 
model fit. All other fit indices indicate acceptable model fit with the exception of GFI and 
AGFI. SRMR at .03 is below the threshold of <.10. Finally, RMSEA of .07 is also below 
the threshold of <.10. Therefore this model (Appendix G) is considered the final CFA 
model and deemed acceptable.  
Table 11. Overall Fit Indices for Modified CFA Model 
Goodness of Fit Measure 
Recommended 
Value 
Values from 
this study 
Chi-square (X2) 
 
1529.67 
Degrees of freedom (df) 
 
670 
Chi-square/df (CMIN/DF) <3.00 2.283 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) >.90 0.768 
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI) >.80 0.730 
Normalized-Fit Index (NFI)* ≥.90 0.913 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)* ≥.90 0.943 
Comparative-Fit Index (CFI)* ≥.90 0.949 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) <.10 0.0358 
Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA) <.10 0.071 
Parsimonious Goodness-of-Fit Index (PGFI) Higher the better 0.659 
Parsimonious Normed-Fit Index (PNFI) Higher the better 0.825 
   
Source: Levy & Green (2009) and Schumacker & Lomax (2010) 
 * Values only important in SEM analysis (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008) 
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Structural Equation Modeling 
The following three steps were involved in SEM process for this study: Model 
specification, model estimation, and proposition testing. The majority of model 
specification was already completed in the CFA phase of this study. Only slight 
modification had to occur from the original model specification. First, the dependent 
factors of security practices (SP) and security behaviors (SB) had to be included in the 
SEM model. The DVs were not originally included in the CFA model, because the 
factors are both dichotomous and formative. Additionally, since the DVs are formative, 
they are considered observed factors, thus the DVs are represented as rectangles in the 
SEM model. After adding the dependent factors, causal paths were established between 
the IVs, MVs and DVs. 
After specifying the SEM model (Appendix H) to mirror the proposed theoretical 
model, model estimation was conducted using ML. The initial fit indices (Table 12) show 
acceptable model fit. NFI at .90, TLI at .93, and CFI at .94 all meet or exceed ≥.90 
threshold. CMIN/DF at 2.28 falls below the <.30 threshold. SRMR and RMSEA also fall 
within acceptable parameters of <.10.  
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Table 12. Initial SEM Goodness of Fit Indices 
Goodness of Fit Measure 
Recommended 
Value 
Values from 
this study 
Chi-square (X2) 
 
1719.72 
Degrees of freedom (df) 
 
753 
Chi-square/df (CMIN/DF) <3.00 2.28 
Normalized-Fit Index (NFI)* ≥.90 0.90 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)* ≥.90 0.93 
Comparative-Fit Index (CFI)* ≥.90 0.94 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) <.10 0.09 
Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA) <.10 0.07 
Parsimonious Goodness-of-Fit Index (PGFI) Higher the better 0.66 
Parsimonious Normed-Fit Index (PNFI) Higher the better 0.83 
 
Source: Levy and Green (2009); Schumacker and Lomax (2010) 
 * Values only important in SEM analysis (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008) 
 
Initial SEM analysis also revealed good significance and relationships between 
most of the factors. The significant factors and relationships are: VA  MISE (β .58, 
p≤.001), TA MISE (β .23, p≤.01), PT MISE (β .15, p≤.01), MISE  SP (β .27, 
p≤.001), and MISE  SB (β .21, p≤.001). Table 13 provides a summary of the regression 
weights and path coefficients. 
Table 13. Initial SEM Regression Weights and Path Coefficients (β) 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 – Default model)    
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Path 
(β) 
IT <--- MISE -.009 0.056 -.153 .879 -.01 
PT <--- MISE 0.163 0.062 2.639 p <.01** .15 
MISE <--- RA .035 .055 .647 .517 .05 
MISE <--- VA .547 0.084 6.50 p ≤.001*** .58 
MISE <--- TA .170 0.060 2.850 p <.01** .23 
SP <--- MISE .338 0.080 4.234 p ≤.001*** .27 
SB <--- MISE .165 0.050 3.302 p ≤.001*** .21 
Sig. * p <.05; **p <.01; *** p <.001  
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Figure 4. Initial SEM results 
Despite overall acceptable model fit and significance between a majority of the 
factors, Schumacker and Lomax (2010) discussed the importance of testing different 
models by changing the interactions between the factors and comparing the different 
models. Although initial SEM specification indicated acceptable model fit as well as 
causal relationships and significance between a majority of the factors, this study 
undertook the recommendation of Schumacker and Lomax (2010). The purpose of 
conducting model respecification was to investigate whether good relationships and 
significance could be accomplished between all the factors, while also maintaining 
acceptable model fit.  
Each model iteration consisted of various SEM path manipulations. The first 
model respecification (Appendix I) was to test direct effects, without the mediating factor 
of MISE, of the exogenous factors on the endogenous factors as some studies suggest 
(Chen et al., 2008; Furnell, 2008; Kumar et al., 2008). For the first model respecification, 
the MV was moved to an IV. After computation of the model without mediating effects, 
subsequent model respecification included MISE as a mediating factor as postulated in 
this study. Results of the model comparisons will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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After several iterations of model respecification, a final model (Appendix J) was 
reached. This final model does vary from the originally proposed theoretical model 
(Figure 2) in Chapter 3 by the removal of IT and PT. IT and PT showed no significance 
or relationship with any of the other proposed factors. The new model resulted in slightly 
better model fit (Table 14), good relationships, and significance between all the factors 
(Table 15). NFI at .90, TLI at .94, and CFI at .94 all exceed the thresholds of ≥.90. 
Additionally, the following significance and path coefficients are the result of the final 
SEM model: RA  VA (β .34, p ≤.001), TA  VA (β .57, p ≤.001), VA  MISE (β 
.83, p ≤.001), MISE  SP (β .28, p ≤.001), and MISE  SB (β .22, p ≤.001). 
Table 14. Final SEM Goodness-of-Fit Indices 
Goodness of Fit Measure Recommended  Value 
Values from this 
study 
Chi-square (X2) 
 
1732.43 
Degrees of freedom (df) 
 
756 
Chi-square/df (CMIN/DF) <3.00 2.29 
Normalized-Fit Index (NFI)* ≥.90 0.90 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)* ≥.90 0.94 
Comparative-Fit Index (CFI)* ≥.90 0.94 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMSR) <.10 0.09 
Root Mean Square of Approximation (RMSEA) <.10 0.07 
Parsimonious Goodness-of-Fit Index (PGFI) Higher the better 0.67 
Parsimonious Normed-Fit Index (PNFI) Higher the better 0.83 
  
 
  
Source: Levy & Green (2009) and Schumacker & Lomax (2010) 
 * Values only important in SEM analysis (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008) 
 
Table 15. Final SEM Regression Weights and Path Coefficients (β) 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 – Default model)    
      Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
Path 
(β) 
VA <--- RA 0.276 0.050 5.519 p ≤.001*** .34 
VA <--- TA .447 .052 8.663 p ≤.001*** .57 
MISE <--- VA .771 0.065 11.771 p ≤.001*** .81 
SP <--- MISE .335 0.080 4.204 p ≤.001*** .27 
SB <--- MISE .165 0.050 3.302 p ≤.001*** .21 
***Sig. p ≤.001  
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Figure 5. Final SEM results 
 
Proposition Testing 
The final step in the SEM analysis was to test the original seven propositions 
outlined in Chapter 3 in order to answer the original research question: Do the factors of 
Mobile InfoSec self-efficacy, vulnerability awareness, threat awareness, risk awareness, 
institutional trust, and party trust demonstrate high reliability and validity in determining 
smartphone users’ security practices and security behaviors? In order to answer this 
question, those seven propositions were developed and analyzed using SEM techniques. 
The first proposition (P1) was: Vulnerability awareness positively impacts mobile 
information security self-efficacy. SEM analysis determined that there was a correlation 
and significance between the two factors (β .58, p ≤.001). Therefore this proposition is 
supported. 
The second proposition (P2) was: Threat awareness positively impacts mobile 
information security self-efficacy. SEM analysis determined that there was a correlation 
and significance between the two factors (β .23, p ≤.01). Therefore, this proposition is 
supported. 
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The third proposition (P3) was: Risk awareness positively impacts mobile 
information security self-efficacy. SEM analysis determined that there was a very small 
correlation and no significance between the two factors (β .05, p = .517). Therefore, this 
proposition is not supported. 
The fourth proposition (P4) was: Institutional trust positively impacts mobile 
information security self-efficacy. SEM analysis determined that there was nearly no 
correlation and no significance between the two factors (β -.01, p = .879). Therefore, this 
proposition is not supported. 
The fifth proposition (P5) was:  Party trust positively impacts mobile information 
security self-efficacy. SEM analysis determined that there was a weak correlation, but 
significance between the two factors (β .15, p ≤.01). Therefore, this proposition is not 
supported. 
The sixth proposition (P6) was:  Mobile information security self-efficacy 
positively impacts security practices. SEM analysis determined that there was a 
correlation and significance between the two factors (β .27, p ≤.001). Therefore, this 
proposition is supported. 
The seventh proposition (P7) was: Mobile information security self-efficacy 
positively impacts security behaviors. SEM analysis determined that there was a 
correlation and significance between the two factors (β .21, p ≤.001). Therefore, this 
proposition is supported. Table 16 provides a summary of outcomes of the propositions. 
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Table 16. Summary Proposition Outcome 
Proposition Significance β Supported 
P1 P<.001*** .58 Yes 
P2 P<.01** .23 Yes 
P3 p.517 .05 No 
P4 p.879 -.01 No 
P5 p.<01** .15 No 
P6 P<.001*** .27 Yes 
P7 p.<001*** .21 Yes 
 
Summary 
This section presented the results of the data analysis of CFA-SEM. The purpose 
of the CFA-SEM was to test the validity, reliability, and model fit of these factors as well 
as conduct SEM analysis to analyze the relationships between the factors within the 
domain of smartphone security.  
The initial CFA model did not exhibit acceptable model fit, therefore model 
respecification had to be conducted. In order to achieve better model fit, error terms 
within the same latent factors that exhibited high modification indices (above 20) were 
covaried. Additionally, the standardized residuals matrix was evaluated to determine if 
any of the measured values were greater than an absolute value of 1.96, which indicates 
factor cross loading. There were four items identified (MISE 1, MISE 6, TA 7, and VA 2) 
with values of 1.96 or greater and removed from further analysis. Once the model 
respecification was complete, acceptable model fit (Appendix G) was achieved. 
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The next step in the data analysis was SEM. The initial run of SEM analysis 
produced strong correlations and significance between the majority of the factors. There 
were four out of seven factor relationships that were correlated and significant (VA  
MISE, TA  MISE, MISE SP, MISE  SB). Despite this finding, model 
respecification was conducted to determine whether strong relationships and significance 
could be accomplished between all the factors, while also maintaining acceptable model 
fit. This model respecification consisted of modifying causal paths between the factors. 
The model respecification was successful and resulted in acceptable model fit as well as 
significance and strong relationships between all the factors.  
Finally, analysis of the propositions was conducted. Based on the initial SEM 
analysis, four of the original propositions were supported, while the remaining three were 
not supported. Model respecification identified potential additional propositions that will 
be discussed in the Recommendations section of Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this study was to test previously validated factors from the traditional 
computer security domain and their applicability in the context of smartphone security. 
This chapter presents the conclusions derived from this study. Additionally, limitations 
and implications to smartphone security will be discussed. Finally, future research and 
recommendations will be discussed followed by a summary of the research. 
Conclusions 
This study argued that inappropriate security behaviors and practices of 
smartphone users are leading to the exposure and compromise of sensitive information. A 
review of extant literature revealed a significant gap in smartphone security, especially 
pertaining to smartphone users and socio-cognitive factors. As such, this study set out to 
find socio-cognitive factors, through literature reviews, that could potentially have an 
effect on security practices and behaviors of smartphone users. 
The result of this literature review revealed user awareness of threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities, user trust in the smartphone application developers and smartphone 
application stores, as well as self-efficacy could potentially play a role in determining the 
security practices and behaviors of smartphone users. From this discovery, the following 
research question was developed: Do the factors of mobile infosec self-efficacy, 
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vulnerability awareness, threat awareness, risk awareness, institutional trust, and party 
trust demonstrate high reliability and validity in determining smartphone users’ security 
practices and security behaviors? In order to answer this research question, seven 
propositions were developed and tested using CFA-SEM analysis techniques based on 
the data collected from 256 survey responses. The research question and propositions 
were derived from an extensive literature review. However, the path correlations in the 
theoretical model are original to this study. Some studies claimed that the specific factors 
were directly attributable to security practices and behaviors, while some argued the 
factors were significantly attributable to self-efficacy, which in turn affected security 
practices and behaviors. This study chose to use self-efficacy as a mediating variable. 
Huang, et al. (2010) asserted that risk, trust, and vulnerability awareness all have 
a significant part in determining a user’s security practices. Additionally, Chen et al. 
(2011) stated that risk awareness was significant in determining self-efficacy, security 
practices, and behaviors. Also, Furnell (2008) noted that users often times know the 
threats, but it does not reflect in their behaviors. Additionally, Furnell also noted that 
there is a significant correlation between awareness and self-efficacy. Conversely, 
Crossler and Belanger (2006) stated awareness had no impact on self-efficacy.  
Lacohee et al. (2006) argued that trust is not a factor in whether or not a user 
conducts online transactions, such as purchasing or downloading smartphone software 
from the smartphone application store. Lachoee et al. further argued that despite a certain 
level of trust a user may have gained they will still conduct risky online behaviors.  
Mylonas et al. (2013) argued that the majority of smartphone users have trust in the 
application stores, but are not aware if the applications are safe. Chin et al. (2012), claim 
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trust is a factor in both self-efficacy as well as security practices. Finally, Ba and Pavlou 
(2002) as well as Shin (2010) also claim trust is significant factor in determining users’ 
security practices.  
The initial CFA model computation resulted in poor model fit indices but strong 
factor loadings. Due to the poor model fit indices, the model had to be modified. 
Modification included covarying the error terms (also sometimes referred to as residuals) 
for any modification indices over 20 and eliminating measured items over 1.96 as 
reported in the standardized residuals matrix. The modified model resulted in acceptable 
fit indices, strong factor loadings, and passed AVE tests indicating discriminate and 
construct reliability was not an issue. As such, the model was deemed acceptable and 
ready to be analyzed using SEM techniques. 
The initial SEM model showed good correlations and significance between a 
majority of the factors. RA had very little correlation with MISE and did not indicate any 
significance. On the other hand, both VA (β.23, p≤.001) and TA (β.58, p≤.01) showed 
good correlations and significance to MISE. Therefore, it can be stated that VA and TA, 
individually, are significant predictors of MISE and therefore propositions 1 and 2 are 
supported. These findings fall in line with the works of Huang et al. (2010), Chen et al. 
(2011) and Furnell (2008). However, this is in stark contrast to Crossler and Belanger’s 
(2006) assertions that awareness has no impact on self-efficacy. 
One must understand that risk, threats, and vulnerabilities all work hand in hand. 
Knowing just one of them will not increase overall information security posture or 
knowledge. For example, one cannot simply understand that viruses exist without 
understanding the vulnerability the virus is going to exploit. It has been noted in 
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information security literature that risk is the product of threats X vulnerabilities (Cox, 
2008). However, that is concerning impact factor, not from a socio-cognitive perspective. 
This study tested Cox’s (2008) theory and found that, from a socio-cognitive perspective, 
vulnerability awareness is actually a product of risk and threats.  As such, in the final 
SEM model, it was found that RA (β .34, p ≤.001) and TA (β .57, p ≤.001) had very 
strong correlations in determining VA, which in turn had a strong correlation and 
significance in determining MISE (β .83, p ≤.001). Therefore, risk, threats, or 
vulnerabilities cannot be studied in isolation to determine their significance on MISE. 
IT showed very little correlation or significance on MISE. On the other hand, PT 
did show a weak correlation, but significance on MISE (β.15, p≤.01). Thus, it can be 
determined that users put more emphasis in trusting the smartphone application 
developers than they do the smartphone application market place. The PT finding could 
be contributable to user reviews, peer pressure, or popularity of the application within the 
marketplace. Moreover, IT could also possibly not be attributable because the users have 
no other choice but to trust the marketplace because they cannot get the software from 
anywhere else; therefore there is no interest in trusting the marketplace. Thus, it can be 
stated that proposition 4 and 5 are not supported. The final SEM model respecification 
did not produce any significantly different results from the initial SEM model as it 
pertains to trust factors. This finding falls in line with the works of Mui et al. (2002), 
Mylonas et al. (2013) and Verhagen et al. (2006) which asserts that users are forced to 
develop a level of trust by default because they have no other options. It should be noted 
that very little emphasis, if any, should be placed on this PT to MISE finding due to the 
weak correlations between the two factors. 
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Finally, MISE showed strong significance and correlations to both SP (β.27, 
p≤.001) and SB (β.21, p≤.001). Therefore, it can be stated that MISE is a significant 
predictor of SP and SB and propositions 6 and 7 are supported. This finding falls in line 
with the works of Ball (2008), Chen et al. (2011), Crossler and Belanger (2006), and 
Rhee et al. (2008). 
In addition to the initial and final SEM model respecification, another one was 
created to test the direct effects of the exogenous factors to the endogenous factors. 
Model fit was not analyzed in this iteration of the model respecification as the sole 
purpose of this specific model respecification was not to test for model fit, but to test the 
direct effects of the exogenous factors on the endogenous factors without any mediating 
effects. According to the direct effect SEM analysis it was found that RA (β-.26, p≤.05), 
VA (β.29, p≤.05), TA (β.38, p≤.001), all had good correlations and significance in 
determining security practices. IT had very little correlation to SP and there was not any 
significance between the two factors. Again, as with both the initial SEM model as well 
as the final SEM model, there was some weak correlation between PT and SP, but there 
was not any significance between the two factors. Therefore, it can be stated that neither 
of the trust factors have any significance nor correlation to security practices, security 
behaviors, or self-efficacy. 
It is interesting to note that RA has an inverse relationship to SP. Although a user 
has increased RA, they still do not properly protect themselves by installing the 
appropriate protective measures such as anti-virus software. This could be an indicator 
that the users feel confident enough that they can avoid the risks associated with using 
their smartphone. It is also interesting to note that the users who claim to have increased 
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RA do not change their risky behaviors despite their lack of security protection. 
Therefore, even though they are aware of the risks, they still perform risky behaviors yet 
do not properly protect themselves (i.e. risk acceptance).  
The purpose behind this research was to answer the following research question: 
Do the factors of mobile infosec self-efficacy, vulnerability awareness, threat awareness, 
risk awareness, institutional trust, and party trust demonstrate high reliability and validity 
in determining smartphone users’ security practices and security behaviors? After 
conducting CFA-SEM analysis and testing the seven original propositions to answer that 
question it can be determined that, mobile infosec self-efficacy, vulnerability awareness, 
threat awareness, and risk awareness all demonstrate high reliability and validity in 
determining smartphone user’s security practices and behaviors. Although, party trust and 
institutional trust demonstrated high reliability and validity, they did not have any 
correlation or significance in determining security practices or behaviors. 
Limitations 
One limitation to this study was the medium used to obtain participants. 
Facebook® and LinkedIn® were used as the marketing mechanism to gather the 
participants. This could be a limiting factor in that the respondents are not truly 
representative of the population. Additionally, as noted in the demographics, more 
women, although not significantly more, responded compared to men. There is a 
possibility that the results could be slight skewed one way or the other from that of the 
overall population. 
Another potential limitation is the data collection method. There is a possibility 
that the data captured may not be a true representation of the respondent’s beliefs. This 
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could possibly be attributable to the lack of comprehension of the questions or the 
definitions. There could have also been unengaged responses (response set) that were 
undetectable to the naked eye and still included in the data analysis. 
Finally, another limitation to this research pertains to its generalizability. This 
study did not undertake any moderating effect analyses based on information security 
background. The number of respondents with information security backgrounds were 
minimal and not enough to conduct a thorough analysis. Therefore, the results of this 
research may not be generalizable to the entire population and may be more applicable to 
people without information security backgrounds. 
Implications 
There is currently a significant gap in smartphone security literature. This is partly 
due to the fact that smartphones are still a relatively new technology and literature has yet 
to catch up to the rapid advancement of smartphones (Mylonas et al., 2013; Park & Chen, 
2007). Therefore, this research has started to address this gap and examined factors that 
have shown to have an influence on user’s security behaviors and practices. This research 
is important to smartphone security literature because the proliferation of smartphone 
devices is rapidly increasing the risk of data exposure (Van Bruggen et al., 2013). This 
study enhanced the smartphone security body of knowledge by attempting to bridge the 
gap between traditional computer security to smartphone security. There have been some 
studies on smartphone security, but very few have addressed the user-focused socio-
cognitive factors that drive the security practices and behaviors of smartphone users. This 
research addressed that gap by assessing the applicability of previously validated 
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constructs from the domain of traditional computer security that was found to have an 
impact on computer security practices and behaviors, to smartphone security. 
Self-efficacy was one of the first factors identified as having a potential impact on 
predicting security practices and behaviors of smartphone users. Self-efficacy was first 
discovered by Bandura (1977). It was later adopted by Compeau and Higgins (1995) and 
applied to computers. Later Eastin and Rose (2000) adopted this factor and applied it to 
the Internet. This research empirically assessed the reliability and validity of self-efficacy 
in predicting user’s security practices and behaviors of smartphone users.  
Crossler and Belanger (2006) stated awareness had no impact in predicting 
computer self-efficacy. Crossler and Belanger also stated that self-efficacy was 
significant in determining the overall adoption rate of security tools such as anti-virus 
software. The results of this research revealed the awareness does in fact have an impact 
on determining self-efficacy, which in turn has predictive significance on security 
practices. Rhee et al. (2009) argued that very little attention has been given to socio-
cognitive factors as it pertains to information security. Rhee et al. found that self-efficacy 
does play a role in determining the security posture of computers users. Chin et al. (2012) 
conducted a study that attempted to gain a deeper insight into smartphone user’s 
perceptions about smartphone security. They found that users are less willing to conduct 
certain actions such as online banking and online shopping. Chin et al. noted that self-
efficacy could be a significant factor that drives these actions and called for future 
research on smartphone self-efficacy. This research answered that call and empirically 
assessed self-efficacy and found that it is a significant factor in determining the security 
posture of smartphone users. 
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Literature reviews conducted on information security has shown that there is 
common agreement that awareness is an important component in how users protect 
themselves. There is very little literature in smartphone information security. Mylonas et 
al. (2012) noted that smartphone security awareness was significantly lacking and argued 
that studies on smartphone security awareness is needed.  Huang et al. (2010) noted that 
most literature on information security only focuses on a single awareness factor. Huang 
et al. argued that more than one factor needs to be studied in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of security practices and behaviors. Huang et al. studied risk, threat, and 
vulnerability awareness and found that all three factors are important factors in 
determining a user’s belief and ability to properly protect themselves from information 
security breaches. Albrectsen (2007) noted that users have very little awareness of risk. 
Chin et al. (2012) also state that smartphone users lack information security awareness. 
To address the gap in literature pertaining to smartphone security awareness, this study 
assessed risk, threat, and vulnerability awareness. The results of this assessment 
determined that vulnerability and threat awareness have predictive significance in 
determining self-efficacy. It was discovered that risk awareness did not have a direct 
impact on self-efficacy. Two possible ways this can be interpreted are: 1) Users are in 
fact not aware of the risks associated with smartphones as claimed by Albrectsen and 
Chin et al. or 2) as previously noted, risk is a product of threats X vulnerabilities and risk 
should only be assessed in such a manner. 
Trust has been studied in an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of consumer 
purchasing habits (Pavlou & Gefen, 2004). Trust is at the root of every transaction and is 
an important topic of research in many fields (Mui et al., 2002). Smartphone applications 
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are delivered to consumers through what is called a marketplace. Unfortunately, users 
have to develop a level of blind trust of these marketplaces and trust that the marketplace 
will only have trustworthy applications available for download (Verhagen et al., 2006). A 
literature review revealed that there is also a gap in literature pertaining to trust as it 
relates to smartphone applications and application marketplaces. Chin et al. (2012) found 
that users are less willing to conduct online transactions on their smartphones which was 
attributable to the lack of trust in the application marketplace and smartphone 
applications themselves. Lacohee et al. (2006) conducted a study on how users perceive 
trust in executing online transactions. Lacohee et al. found that if the user could somehow 
shift the burden of risk, such as using a credit card and putting the risk on the credit card 
company, they are more likely to complete the transaction. Mylonas et al. (2013) found 
that users were completely unaware if applications were trustworthy. Finally, Shin (2010 
conducted a study on the effects of trust in using social networking sites. Shin found that 
trust was a factor in determining self-efficacy. This study addressed the smartphone trust 
literature gap by empirically assessing both institutional trust (marketplace) and party 
trust (applications). The results of this research revealed that trust was not a significant 
predictor of self-efficacy, nor did it have any direct significance in determining security 
practices or behaviors. A possible interpretation of this finding is that trust is irrelevant in 
the context of smartphones because users can only get their smartphone software from 
one place. Therefore, the user has no choice but to trust the marketplace and the 
developers. 
In summary, a total awareness of risk, threat, and vulnerabilities combined are 
significant predictors of self-efficacy, which in turn has predictive significance in 
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determining smartphone user’s security practices and behaviors. Trust on the other hand, 
was found to have no significance in determining any of the factors in this research. 
Recommendations 
This study found that and increased awareness in risks and threats combined, 
increases awareness of the specific vulnerabilities. With that, organizations need to take a 
holistic approach when educating their employees. Organizations cannot focus on risk, 
threats, or vulnerabilities in isolation. Users need to be educated on all factors that may 
lead to sensitive information disclosure. 
Future research in smartphone security needs to continue to be explored. As it 
currently stands, very little research on smartphone security exists. This study found that 
there is an intricate relationship between risk, threat, and vulnerability awareness and that 
an increased awareness in just one of these categories will not have an impact on a user’s 
security practices and behaviors. Cox (2008) noted that risk is the product of threats X 
vulnerabilities X impact. However, Cox’s finding is based on an impact factor. In other 
words, as threats become more powerful, the vulnerabilities more abundant, then the 
greater the risk impact will be. This study found that on a socio-cognitive level,  
vulnerability awareness is the product of risk and threat awareness. Future research 
should measure impact factor awareness and its significance in determining security 
practices and behaviors. Additionally, future research should focus on a baseline critical 
ratio of awareness factors before awareness can be deemed effective. 
Another finding of this study was that risk had an inverse relationship on security 
practices and no impact on security behaviors. Future research should investigate why 
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users exhibit a certain level of risk acceptance, rather than modify their security behaviors 
and protect themselves with the appropriate security software such as antivirus software. 
Finally, future research should also investigate moderating factors such as 
experience, gender, or information security backgrounds. Investigating these moderating 
factors may lead to new discoveries of additional factors that need to be considered when 
devising a smartphone security plan. 
Summary 
The proliferation of smartphone devices is introducing new IS risks, which if not 
properly mitigated through appropriate security practices and behaviors, can result in the 
exposure of sensitive data (Anderson et al., 2008; Chin et al., 2012; Furnell et al., 2008; 
Jones & Heinrichs, 2012; Landman, 2010; Van Bruggen at al., 2013). The exposure of 
this sensitive data can have catastrophic effects both personally and from an 
organizational perspective. From the personal perspective, sensitive information exposure 
can lead to identity theft. Organizationally, sensitive data exposure can lead to the release 
of trade secrets or insider information that can reduce or eliminate competitive advantage. 
An organizational breach can also lead to the release of consumer information which, 
again in turn, can lead to identity theft of an individual. 
  The main research question this study addressed was: Do the factors of Mobile 
InfoSec self-efficacy, vulnerability awareness, threat awareness, risk awareness, 
institutional trust, and party trust demonstrate high reliability and validity in determining 
smartphone users’ security practices and security behaviors? The purpose of this study 
was to conduct confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the validity, reliability, and 
model fit of these factors as well as conduct structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis 
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to analyze the relationships between the factors within the domain of smartphone 
security. 
In order to answer this research question a survey was developed and distributed 
to a five-member expert panel to ensure clarity and face value validity of the constructs. 
After receiving feedback from the expert panel, the survey was updated to change the 
minor errors noted in the feedback. The minor errors noted in the expert panel feedback 
consisted of only spelling errors and slightly modifying the definitions to produce more 
clarity. The survey was then distributed to a population base of 539 people throught 
LinkedIn® and Facebook® with a response rate of 275 people (50.6%). 
Once the survey was turned off, pre analysis data screening was conducted to 
search for response set (unengaged responses), missing data, normality, multicollinearity, 
and demographics. There were a total of 13 unengaged responses that were thrown out of 
further data analysis. There was not any missing data. There were not any univariate 
outliers. However, six multivariate outliers were identified and removed before 
conducting further analysis. This resulted in 256 responses available for final analysis. 
The first step in the data analysis portion of this study was to test for model fit of 
the proposed model using CFA in order to determine if the model was acceptable. The 
initial CFA model did not produce acceptable goodness of fit indices. Thus, the initial 
model was deemed not acceptable. However, as part of the CFA technique, the researcher 
needs to further evaluate additional items such as modification indices and the 
standardized residual covariance matrix to ensure there are not any redundancies among 
the latent factors. After reviewing the additional indices, four measured items were 
removed from the latent factors as well as covarying some of the unobserved error terms 
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(sometimes referred to as residuals) of the latent factors. After the second iteration of 
CFA was conducted the model fit indices significantly improved with all model fit 
indices’ minimums being met or exceeded. Therefore, the second model was deemed an 
acceptable model fit, meaning it was suitable for SEM evaluation.  
The initial SEM mode analysis resulted in good model fit as well as good 
correlations and significance between four of the factors. These four factors were: VA  
MISE (β .58, p ≤.001), TA  MISE (β .23, p ≤.01), MISE SP (β .27, p ≤.001), and 
MISE  SB (β .21, p ≤.001). Although the initial SEM (Appendix H) model exhibited 
good model fit indices as well as correlations and significance between four out of the 
seven factors, model respecification was conducted in an attempt to see if there were any 
other causal relationships that could be uncovered, while still maintaining good model fit. 
The SEM model respecification (Appendix J) analysis discovered that risk 
awareness and threat awareness were antecedents to vulnerability awareness. It was 
found that RA (β .34, p ≤.001) and TA (β .57, p ≤.001) had very strong correlations in 
determining VA, which in turn had a strong correlation and significance in determining 
MISE (β .83, p ≤.001). This finding is an indicator that risk awareness, threat awareness, 
and vulnerability awareness work hand in hand and all need to be understood in order to 
raise awareness and self-efficacy. Some information security literature has noted that RA 
is a product of VA X TA and should all be analyzed together (for example Cox, 2008). 
Another SEM model respecification (Appendix I) was done to test for direct 
effects of RA, TA, and VA on SP and SB. According to the direct effect SEM analysis it 
was found that RA (β-.26, p≤.05), VA (β.29, p≤.05), TA (β.38, p≤.001), all had good 
correlations and significance in determining security practices.  
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An interesting finding is that RA has an inverse relationship to SP. Although a 
user has increased RA, they still do not properly protect themselves by installing the 
appropriate protective measures such as anti-virus software. This could be an indicator 
that the user feels confident enough that they can avoid the risks associated with using 
their smartphone. It is also interesting to note that the users who claim to have increased 
RA do not change their risky behaviors despite their lack of security protection. 
Collectively, the user is willing to accept the risk and as noted in the Future Research 
section, this is cause for further investigation. 
Finally, the main research question can be answered that Mobile InfoSec self-
efficacy, vulnerability awareness, threat awareness, and risk awareness, demonstrate high 
reliability and validity in determining smartphone users’ security practices and security 
behaviors. However, vulnerability awareness, threat awareness, and risk awareness are 
mediated by MISE when determining security practices and behaviors. Party trust and 
institutional trust demonstrated no significance in determining security practices or 
behaviors. These findings should give smartphone users and organizations insight into 
specific areas of focus in minimizing inappropriate security behaviors and practices of 
smartphone users. More specifically, users and organizations need to focus on all three 
factors of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities in order for there to have any impact on 
reducing inappropriate security behaviors and practices. Having an increased awareness 
of just one of the factors, showed very little impact in effecting security practices and 
behaviors of smartphone users. 
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Appendix A 
 
Preliminary Survey Instrument 
 
 
Item Question Scale 
  
 
Totally not 
Confident 
     
Totally 
confident 
MISE 1 
I feel confident in handling viruses on my 
smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 2 
I feel confident in handling spyware on my 
smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 3 
I feel confident understanding terms/words 
relating to smartphone information 
security? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 4 
I feel confident in learning the method to 
protect my smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 5 
I feel confident managing information stored 
in my smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 6 
I feel confident using different programs on 
my smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 7 
I feel confident learning advanced skills to 
protect my information and my 
smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 8 
I feel confident in getting help for problems 
related to the security of my information 
and my smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 9 
I feel confident using the user's guide when 
help is needed to protect my information 
and my smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 10 
I feel confident in updating security patches 
to my phones operating system? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
MISE 11 
I feel confident in switching security levels of 
my Internet browser on my smartphone? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    
Totally 
Unaware           
Totally 
Aware 
VA 1 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities related to 
streaming videos on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VA 2 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities related to 
phone calls on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VA 3 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities related to 
using social media on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VA 4 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities related to 
text messaging on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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VA 5 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities related to 
email on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VA 6 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities related to 
making online purchase on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VA 7 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities related to 
online banking on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VA 8 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities associated 
with pictures and videos on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VA 9 
I am aware of the vulnerabilities related to 
surfing the Internet on smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    
Totally 
Unaware           
Totally 
Aware 
TA 1 
I am aware that smartphones are 
susceptible to virus attacks? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TA 2 
I am aware that smartphones are 
susceptible to malware attacks? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TA 3 
I am aware that smartphones are 
susceptible to phishing attacks? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TA 4 
I am aware that smartphones are 
susceptible to spyware attacks? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TA 5 
I am aware that smartphones are 
susceptible to surveillance attacks? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TA 6 
I am aware that smartphones are 
susceptible to network attacks? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
TA 7 
I am aware that smartphones are 
susceptible to being used for identity theft? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    
Totally 
Unaware           
Totally 
Aware 
RA 1 
I am aware that an unauthorized person 
could view sensitive emails on unsecured 
smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RA 2 
I am aware that an unauthorized person 
could view pictures on unsecured 
smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RA 3 
I am aware that an unauthorized person 
could view personal contacts on unsecured 
smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RA 4 
I am aware that an unauthorized person 
could view text messages on unsecured 
smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RA 5 
I am aware that an unauthorized person 
could view financial information (credit 
cards/banking information) on unsecured 
smartphones 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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RA 6 
I am aware that an unauthorized person can 
view sensitive documents on unsecured 
smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RA 7 
I am aware that an unauthorized person 
could view Internet browsing habits on 
unsecured smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RA 8 
I am aware that an unauthorized person 
could place costly phone calls from 
unsecured smartphones? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    
Totally 
Disagree           
Totally 
Agree 
IT 1 
The online app store ensures sellers are 
dependable? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IT 2 
The online app store ensures sellers are 
reliable? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IT 3 
The online app store ensures sellers are 
honest? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IT 4 
The online app store ensures sellers are 
trustworthy? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
    
Totally 
Disagree           
Totally 
Agree 
PT 1 
Sellers of applications in the online app store 
are generally dependable? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PT 2 
Sellers of applications in the online App 
store are generally reliable? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PT 3 
Sellers of applications in the online App 
store are generally honest? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
PT 4 
Sellers of applications in the online app store 
are generally trustworthy? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
SP 1 
Do you currently have anti-virus software on 
your smartphone? Yes No 
     
SP2 
Do you currently have anti-spyware on your 
smartphone? Yes No 
     
SP3 
Do you currently have email spam filter 
installed on your smartphone? Yes No 
     
SP4 
Do you currently have a firewall installed on 
your smartphone? Yes No 
     
SP 5 
Do you currently have any sort of encryption 
installed on your smartphone? Yes No 
     
         
SB 1 
Do you use file sharing software (Kazaa, E-
Donkey, etc.) from your smartphone? Yes No 
     
SB 2 
Do you make backup copies of your files 
from your smartphone? Yes No 
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SB 3 
Do you have sensitive documents such as 
medical, financial, or banking stored on your 
smartphone? Yes No 
     
SB 4 
Does your smartphone require some form of 
authentication (PIN, Password, Pattern) 
before getting access? Yes No 
     
SB 5 
When transferring data on the Internet from 
your smartphone do you check to see if the 
site is secured? Yes No 
     
SB 6 
Have you shared your smartphone with 
other people? Yes No 
     
         DEM 1 Gender M F         
DEM 2 Age 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 44-64 65+ 
DEM 3 
Highest education level 
completed? 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
Associate 
degree 
Bachelor 
Degree 
Master 
Degree PhD 
DEM 4 Marital Status? Single Married Divorced Widowed     
DEM 5 
Number of years using 
computers? Nominal 
    
  
DEM 6 
Number of years using 
smartphones? Less than 5 5-10 yrs 10-15 yrs 15-20 yrs     
DEM 7 
Do you have an information 
systems security background 
(i.e. training, education, 
certification)? Yes no 
   
  
DEM 8 
Current smartphone 
operating system? iOS Android Windows Blackberry Other unk 
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Appendix B 
 
Email to expert panel 
 
Hello, My name is Joe Simpson and I am a Ph.D. student at the Graduate School of 
Computer and Information Sciences, Nova Southeastern University. I am in the final 
stages of my Ph.D . program and currently working on my dissertation. Before I begin 
data collection, I am assembling a team of members to form an expert panel to review my 
survey before distributing it for data collection. The reason you are receiving this email is 
I have identified you as a potential member of my expert panel due to your information 
security background and/or your terminal degree in information systems. 
The title of my dissertation is Empirical Analysis of Socio-Cognitive factors that affect 
smartphone security practices and behaviors. I am using previously validated factors from 
existing literature in the traditional computer security domain and testing for applicability 
and validity in the smartphone context. 
I ask that you take 20-30 minutes of your time to review my survey, located here 
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1VB0T2Vlfi5FyMfGqreA86luSdBgC0J-
scT3hkX2y194/viewform, to ensure there are no ambiguities, misspellings, redundancies 
as well as completeness of the survey. 
If you have any questions regarding this study, you may contact me at js3185@nova.edu. 
Thanks for your consideration and I appreciate your assistance.  
 
Best Regards, 
Joe Simpson  
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Appendix C 
 
Final Survey Instrument 
 
Smartphone Survey 
Dear participants, 
 
I am a Ph.D. Candidate at Nova Southeastern University and am conducting a survey 
to gain a deeper understanding of smartphone users' security behaviors and practices 
as partial fulfillment of my Ph.D.. 
 
By participating in this survey you agree and understand that your responses are 
completely anonymous and responses cannot be traced to any individual. Additionally, 
you may exit this survey at anytime and your responses will not be recorded. 
Completing this survey indicates your voluntary participation in this study. By taking 
this survey you certify that you are over the age of 18 years old. The data collected in 
this survey may be published to facilitate further research on user security behavior on 
smartphones. 
 
Please answer all the questions as honestly and accurately as possible. The data 
collected is completely anonymous. 
 
Mobile InfoSec Self-Efficacy 
A person’s belief in their own abilities to exercise control over events and actions related to their mobile 
devices. 
 
 
Completely 
not 
Confident 
  
Moderately 
Confident 
 
 
Completely 
Confident 
1. I feel confident in 
removing viruses from my 
smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel confident in 
removing spyware from 
my smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel confident 
understanding terms 
relating to smartphone 
information security. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4.I feel confident in 
learning how to protect my 
smartphone. *  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I feel confident 
managing data stored in 
my smartphone. *  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I feel confident using 
different apps on my 
smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I feel confident learning 
advanced skills to protect 
my information and my 
smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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8. I feel confident in getting 
help for problems related 
to the security of my 
information and my 
smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I feel confident using the 
user's guide when help is 
needed to protect my 
personal information and 
my smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I feel confident in 
updating security patches 
to my smartphone's 
operating system. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I feel confident in 
switching security levels of 
my Internet browser on 
my smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        Vulnerability Awareness 
A vulnerability is a flaw, loophole, oversight, or error that can be exploited to violate system security policy. 
 
Completely 
Unaware   
Moderately 
Aware   
Completely 
Aware 
1. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities related to 
watching videos on 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities related to 
phone calls on 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities related to 
using social media on 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities related to 
text messaging on 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities related to 
email on smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities related to 
making online purchase on 
smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities related to 
online banking on 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities associated 
with pictures and videos on 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I am aware of the 
vulnerabilities related to 
surfing the Internet on 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Threat Awareness 
A threat is a natural or manmade event that could have some type of negative impact on the organization. 
 
Completely 
Unaware   
Moderately 
Aware   
Completely 
Aware 
1. I am aware that 
smartphones are 
susceptible to virus 
attacks. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I am aware that 
smartphones are 
susceptible to malware 
attacks. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am aware that 
smartphones are 
susceptible to phishing 
attacks. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am aware that 
smartphones are 
susceptible to spyware 
attacks. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I am aware that 
smartphones are 
susceptible to surveillance 
attacks. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I am aware that 
smartphones are 
susceptible to network 
attacks. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I am aware that 
smartphones are 
susceptible to being used 
for identity theft. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Risk Awareness 
Risk is a situation involving exposure to danger; the possibility that something unpleasant will happen. 
 
Completely 
Unaware   
Moderately 
Aware   
Completely 
Aware 
1. I am aware that an 
unauthorized person could 
view sensitive emails on 
unsecured smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I am aware that an 
unauthorized person could 
view pictures on unsecured 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I am aware that an 
unauthorized person could 
view personal contacts on 
unsecured smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I am aware that an 
unauthorized person could 
view text messages on 
unsecured smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I am aware that an 
unauthorized person could 
view financial information 
(credit cards/banking 
information) on unsecured 
smartphone. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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6. I am aware that an 
unauthorized person can 
view sensitive documents 
on unsecured 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I am aware that an 
unauthorized person could 
view Internet browsing 
habits on unsecured 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I am aware that an 
unauthorized person could 
place costly phone calls 
from unsecured 
smartphones. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Institutional Trust 
The faith a user has that online application stores only distributes software that is safe for use, free from defects, and 
devoid of malicious code. Online app stores are Google Play Store, iTunes, Apple App Store, etc. 
 
Completely 
Disagree   Neutral   
Completely 
Agree 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. The online app store 
ensures sellers are 
dependable. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The online app store 
ensures sellers are reliable. 
* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. The online app store 
ensures sellers are honest. 
* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The online app store 
ensures sellers are 
trustworthy. * 
       
        Party Trust 
Faith a user has that a software developer has made the software safe for use, free from defects, and devoid of 
malicious code. 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
  
Neutral 
  
Completely 
Agree 
1. Sellers of applications in 
the online app store are 
generally dependable. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Sellers of applications in 
the online app store are 
generally reliable. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Sellers of applications in 
the online app store are 
generally honest.* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Sellers of applications in 
the online app store are 
generally trustworthy. * 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Security practices 
The technological aspect that a user takes (i.e. installing security applications) to protect their mobile device 
        1. Do you currently have 
antivirus software on your 
smartphone? * Yes No           
2. Do you currently have 
email spam filter installed 
on your smartphone? * Yes No 
     3. Do you currently have 
antispyware on your 
smartphone? * Yes No           
4. Do you currently have a 
firewall installed on your 
smartphone? * Yes No 
     5. Do you currently have 
any sort of encryption 
installed on your 
smartphone? * Yes No           
        
Security Behaviors 
The security conscious behavior and actions that a user demonstrates/conducts while using their mobile device. 
        1. Do you use file 
sharing software 
(Kazaa, EDonkey, 
etc.) from your 
smartphone? * Yes No           
2. Do you make 
backup copies of your 
files from your 
smartphone? * Yes No 
     3. Do you have 
sensitive documents 
such as medical, 
financial, or banking 
stored on your 
smartphone? * Yes No           
4. Does your 
smartphone require 
some form of 
authentication (PIN, 
Password, Pattern) 
before getting access? 
* Yes No 
     5. When transferring 
data on the Internet 
from your 
smartphone do you 
check to see if the site 
is secured? * Yes No           
6. Have you shared 
your smartphone with 
other people? * Yes No 
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Demographics 
        
Gender * Male Female           
Age * 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ 
  
Highest level of 
education * 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
Associate 
Degree 
Bachelor 
Degree 
Graduate 
Degree     
Marital Status * Single Married Divorced Widowed Separated 
  Number of years 
using a smartphone *  Please type an answer between 1 and 20   
Do you have an 
information systems 
security background 
(i.e. training, 
education, 
certification)? * Yes No 
    What type of 
smartphone do you 
currently use? * Android iPhone Windows Blackberry Other 
Don't 
know 
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Appendix D 
 
Participant Recruitment Post  
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Appendix E 
 
IRB Approval  
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Appendix F 
 
Initial CFA Model with Estimation  
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Appendix G 
 
Modified CFA Model with Estimation  
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Appendix H 
Initial SEM Model with Estimation 
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Appendix I 
Direct Effect SEM Model with Estimation  
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Appendix J 
Final SEM Model with Estimation 
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